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Audience metrics have become ubiquitous in news organizations, but there
has been little empirical research on how the data is produced or how it af-
fects newsroom culture and journalists’ daily work. The Tow Center sought to
understand how the use of metrics changes reporters’ behavior and what this
means for journalism. Thus, researcher Caitlin Petre conducted ethnographic
analysis of the role of metrics in journalism, focusing on three case studies:
Chartbeat, a dominant metrics vendor; Gawker Media, a newsroom intently
focused on metrics; and The New York Times, a legacy news outlet where met-
rics are currently more peripheral. Petre offers the following key points based
on her findings.
• Metrics exert a powerful influence over journalists’ emotions and
morale.
Metrics inspire a range of strong feelings in journalists, such as excitement,
anxiety, self-doubt, triumph, competition, and demoralization. When de-
vising internal policies for the use of metrics, newsroom managers should
consider the potential effects of traffic data not only on editorial content, but
also on editorial workers.
• Traffic-based rankings can drown out other forms of evaluation.
It is not uncommon for journalists to become fixated on metrics that rank
them or their stories, even if these are not the sole criteria by which they
are evaluated. Once rankings have a prominent place on a newsroom wall or
website, it can be difficult to limit their influence.
• News organizations can benefit from big-picture, strategic think-
ing about analytics.
Most journalists are too busy with their daily assignments to think ex-
tensively or abstractly about the role of metrics in their organization, or
which metrics best complement their journalistic goals. As a result, they
tend to consult, interpret, and use metrics in an ad hoc way. But this
data is simply too powerful to implement on the fly. Newsrooms should
create opportunities—whether internally or by partnering with outside
researchers—for reflective, deliberate thinking removed from daily produc-
tion pressures about how best to use analytics.
• When a news organization is choosing an analytics service, it
should consider the business model and the values of the vendor.
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We have a tendency to see numbers—and, by extension, analytics dashboards—
as authoritative and dispassionate reflections of the empirical world. When
selecting an analytics service, however, it’s important to remember that an-
alytics companies have their own business imperatives. Newsroom managers
should consider which analytics company’s values, branding strategy, and
strategic objectives best align with their own goals.
• Not everything can—or should—be counted.
Efforts to improve audience analytics and to measure the impact of news are
important and worthwhile. But newsroom, analytics companies, funders, and
media researchers might consider how some of journalism’s most compelling
and indispensable traits, such as its social mission, are not easily measured.
At a time when data analytics are increasingly valorized, we must take care
not to equate what is quantifiable with what is valuable.
Executive Summary
In a 2010 New Yorker profile, founder and CEO of Gawker Media Nick Denton
argued, “probably the biggest change in Internet media isn’t the immediacy of
it, or the low costs, but the measurability.”1 Digital media scholars and com-
mentators could debate this claim exhaustively (and have), but there is little
doubt that the ability to extensively track news readers’ behavior online is in-
deed a profound shift from the pre-Internet era. Newsrooms can now access
real-time data on how readers arrive at a particular site or article, how often
they visit, and what they do once they get there (e.g., how long they spend
on a page, how far they scroll, and whether they are moving their mouse or
pressing any keys).
What does all this data mean for the production of news? In the earlier
days of web analytics, editorial metrics had both enthusiastic proponents and
impassioned detractors. Nowadays the prevailing view is that metrics aren’t, by
definition, good or bad for journalism. Rather, the thinking goes, it all depends
what is measured: Some metrics, like page views, incentivize the production
of celebrity slide shows and other vapid content, while others, like time on a
page, reward high-quality journalism. Still, there are some who doubt that even
so-called “engagement metrics” can peacefully coexist with (let alone bolster)
journalistic values.
This report’s premise is that it will be impossible to settle these debates
until we understand how people and organizations are producing, interpreting,
and using metrics. I conducted an ethnographic study of the role of metrics
in contemporary news by examining three case studies: Chartbeat, Gawker
Media, and The New York Times. Through a combination of observation and
interviews with product managers, data scientists, reporters, bloggers, editors,
and others, my intention was to unearth the assumptions and values that un-
derlie audience measures, the effect of metrics on journalists’ daily work, and
the ways in which metrics interact with organizational culture. Among the
central discoveries:
• Analytics dashboards have important emotional dimensions that
are too often overlooked. Metrics, and the larger “big data” phenomenon
of which they are a part, are commonly described as a force of rationaliza-
tion: that is, they allow people to make decisions based on dispassionate,
objective information rather than unreliable intuition or judgment. While
this portrayal is not incorrect, it is incomplete. The power and appeal of
12 COLUMBIA JOURNALISM SCHOOL | TOW CENTER FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM
metrics are significantly grounded in the data’s ability to elicit particular
feelings, such as excitement, disappointment, validation, and reassurance.
Chartbeat knows that this emotional valence is a powerful part of the dash-
board’s appeal, and the company includes features to engender emotions in
users. For instance, the dashboard is designed to communicate deference to
journalistic judgment, cushion the blow of low traffic, and provide opportuni-
ties for celebration in newsrooms.
• The impact of an analytics tool depends on the organization using
it. It is often assumed that the very presence of an analytics tool
will change how a newsroom operates in particular ways. However,
the report finds that organizational context is highly influential in shaping if
and how metrics influence the production of news. For instance, Gawker Me-
dia and The New York Times are both Chartbeat clients, but the tool mani-
fests in vastly different ways in each setting. At Gawker, metrics were highly
visible and influential. At The Times, they were neither, and seemed—to
the extent they were used at all—primarily to corroborate decisions editors
had already made. This suggests that it is impossible to know how analytics
are affecting journalism without examining how they are used in particular
newsrooms.
• For writers, a metrics-driven culture can be simultaneously a
source of stress and reassurance. It is also surprisingly compatible with
a perception of editorial freedom. While writers at Gawker Media found
traffic pressures stressful, many were far more psychologically affected by
online vitriol in comments and on social media. In a climate of online hostil-
ity or even harassment, writers sometimes turned to metrics as a reassuring
reminder of their professional competence. Interestingly, writers and editors
generally did not perceive the company’s traffic-based evaluation systems as
an impediment to their editorial autonomy. This suggests that journalists at
online-only media companies like Gawker Media may have different notions
of editorial freedom and constraint than their legacy media counterparts.
The report calls for more research on analytics in a number of areas. More
information is needed about readers’ responses to metrics. Are they aware that
their behavior on news sites is being tracked to the extent that it is? If so, how
(if at all) does this affect their behavior? The report also advocates for more
studies using systematic content analysis to determine if and how metrics are
influencing news content. Finally, I suggest further ethnographic research on
the growing movement to create so-called “impact metrics.”
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The report also makes three recommendations to news organizations. First,
news organizations should prioritize strategic thinking on analytics-related is-
sues (i.e., the appropriate role of metrics in the organization and the ways in
which data interacts with the organization’s journalistic goals). Engagement
with these big-picture questions should be insulated from daily traffic and re-
porting pressures but otherwise can take various forms; for instance, newsrooms
that are unable to spare the resources for an in-house analytics strategist may
benefit from partnerships with outside researchers. Second, when choosing an
analytics service, newsroom managers should look beyond the tools and con-
sider which company’s strategic objectives, business imperatives, and values
best complement those of their newsroom. Finally, though efforts to develop
better metrics are necessary and worthwhile, newsrooms and analytics compa-
nies should be attentive to the limitations of metrics. As organizational priori-
ties and evaluation systems are increasingly built on metrics, there is danger in
conflating what is quantitatively measurable with what is valuable.

Introduction
On August 23, 2013, the satirical news site The Onion published an op-ed pur-
porting to be written by CNN digital editor Meredith Artley, titled “Let Me
Explain Why Miley Cyrus’ VMA Performance Was Our Top Story This Morn-
ing.” The answer, the piece explained matter-of-factly, was “pretty simple.”
It was an attempt to get you to click on CNN.com so that we could drive up
our web traffic, which in turn would allow us to increase our advertising rev-
enue. There was nothing, and I mean nothing, about that story that related to
the important news of the day, the chronicling of significant human events, or
the idea that journalism itself can be a force for positive change in the world
. . . But boy oh boy did it get us some web traffic.2
The piece went on to mention specific metrics like page views and bounce
rates as factors that motivated CNN to give the Cyrus story prominent home
page placement.
Of course, Artley did not actually write the story, but it hit a nerve in media
circles nonetheless—especially since a story on Cyrus’s infamous performance
at the MTV Video Music Awards had occupied the top spot on CNN.com and,
as the real Meredith Artley later confirmed, did bring in the highest traffic of
any story on the site that day.3 The fake op-ed can be interpreted not only as
a condemnation of CNN, but also as a commentary on the sorry state of news
judgment in the era of web metrics.
Media companies have always made efforts to collect data on their audi-
ences’ demographics and behavior. But the tracking capabilities of the Internet,
as well as the ability to store and parse massive amounts of data, mean that
audience metrics have grown far more sophisticated in recent years. In addition
to the aforementioned page views and bounce rates, analytics tools track vari-
ables like visitors’ return rates, referral sites, scroll depths, and time spent on a
page. Much of this data is delivered to news organizations in real time.i
The widespread availability of audience data has prompted fierce debates in
the journalism field. The Onion op-ed succinctly encapsulates one common po-
sition in this conflict, which is that metrics—or, more specifically, the desperate
i. While this report focuses on tools that track audiences’ online actions, it is important
to note that there is a burgeoning movement to measure offline media effects. Such results,
like changes in laws or increased civic participation, are also crucial aspects of journalism’s
impact and should not be neglected in conversations about news metrics. The Center for In-
vestigative Reporting and ProPublica’s Richard Tofel have done valuable work to catalogue
and measure these offline impacts.
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quest for revenue they represent—are causing journalists to abdicate their high-
est duties: to inform their audiences about the most important public issues of
the day and to hold the powerful accountable. The more attention journalists
pay to audience clicks, views, and shares, the more Miley Cyrus slide shows will
beat out stories on important, difficult subjects like Syria or climate change.
Proponents of an opposing view argue that the increased prominence of metrics
in newsrooms is a powerful force of democratization in the media, offering a
welcome end to the days when editors dictated which world events were impor-
tant enough to be newsworthy. Differing views on metrics have manifested in a
range of organizational policies for distributing and using the data: Many news
sites make metrics widely available to editorial staff; some, such as Gawker Me-
dia and The Oregonian, have even paid writers partly based on traffic. Still, a
(smaller) number of news sites, including The New York Times and Vox Me-
dia’s The Verge, actively limit reporters’ access to metrics.4
It’s not surprising that metrics have become a hot-button issue in journal-
ism. Their presence invites a number of ever-present tensions in commercial
news media to come crashing into the foreground. Among them: What is the
fundamental mission of journalism, and how can news organizations know when
they achieve that mission? How can media companies reconcile their profit
imperative with their civic one? To the extent that the distinction between
journalist and audience is still meaningful, what kind of relationship should
journalists have with their readers?
In the midst of these normative questions, collective anxiety, and tech-
evangelist hype, there must be more empirical research into the role that au-
dience metrics actually play in the field of journalism.ii To know what metrics
mean for the future of news, we need to know how journalists interpret them
and what exactly they do with this data in daily work. Perhaps even more
importantly, we need to know more about the values, assumptions, and motiva-
tions of the companies that collect and market data.
This report aims to help fill these gaps. I undertook an ethnographic study
of three companies— Chartbeat, the prominent web analytics startup, and two
of the media organizations that use its tools, Gawker Mediaiii and The New
York Times. I conducted interviews with staff members at these companies
ii. For important exceptions, see work by C.W. Anderson, Pablo Boczkowski, Angèle
Christin, and Nikki Usher.
iii. To limit unwieldy terminology, from now on I will use the term Gawker to refer to
Gawker Media; the blog of the same name will be referred to as Gawker.com.
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and observed meetings and interactions when possible.iv While these organiza-
tions are influential enough to merit study in their own right, they are meant
to serve primarily as case studies that shed light on broader dynamics, work
routines, and ideas surrounding metrics. For that reason, while I am attentive
to their specificities, my primary interest is in the ways in which they are not
unique—in other words, the ways in which the dynamics I observed might be
extreme versions of those occurring at similar organizations.
Ethnographic research is, almost by definition, slow; it takes time to get to
know how a workplace operates and establish an open and trusting rapport
with subjects. The digital media field, which continues to change at a dizzying
speed, poses particular challenges for this kind of slower-paced research. As I
discuss in the conclusion, the three companies I studied have changed in terms
of personnel and, in the case of Gawker and The Times, organizational struc-
ture since I concluded my research; they undoubtedly will continue to do so.
Even so, this research is intended as more than a snapshot of these companies’
orientation toward metrics at a particular point in time. The ever-changing na-
ture of the digital media field presents a challenge, but also a valuable exercise:
It forces researchers to zoom out from particular details (the newest metric, the
latest newsroom shake-up) and identify the bigger analytic themes that charac-
terize the creation, interpretation, and use of news metrics. That is, above all,
what this report aims to accomplish.
In conducting this research, I was interested in three big questions. First,
how are metrics produced? At a time in which “let the data speak” is a com-
mon refrain in popular media, and judgments made on the basis of “number
crunching” are widely considered more objective and reliable than those made
using other methods, it is easy to forget that numbers are socially produced—
that is, they are made by particular groups in particular contexts. There is
substantial value in studying what sociologists Wendy Espeland and Mitchell
Stevens call “the work of quantification.”5 By examining the taken-for-granted
assumptions, values, and motivations of the individuals and groups performing
this work, we can develop a deeper, richer understanding of the numbers they
produce.
In the case of metrics, researchers know quite a lot about the interests and
principles of the journalists using analytics tools, but not much about the pro-
grammers, data scientists, designers, product leads, marketers, and salespeople
who make and sell these tools. How do they decide which aspects of audience
iv. In some instances quotes from interviewees that appear in this report have been edited
for readability, always with an eye toward maintaining their original intent and meaning.
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behavior should be measured and how to measure them? What ideas—about
both those whose behavior they are measuring (news consumers) and those
who will be using their tool (journalists)—are embedded in these decisions?
How do analytics firms communicate the value of metrics to news organiza-
tions?
My second big question: how are metrics interpreted? Despite their opposing
stances, arguments that metrics are good or bad for journalism have one thing
in common: They tend to assume that the meaning of metrics is clear and
straightforward. But a number on its own does not mean anything without a
conceptual framework with which to interpret it. Who makes sense of metrics,
and how do they do it?
Finally, I wanted to know how metrics are used in news work. Does data
inform the way newsrooms assign, write, and promote stories? In which ways,
if any, is data a factor in personnel decisions such as raises, promotions, and
layoffs? Does data play more of a role in daily work or long-term strategy?
And how do answers to these questions differ across organizational contexts?
As the report ventures answers to these questions, it sidesteps a more fa-
miliar (though, I would argue, less fruitful) one: do metrics represent a healing
salve for the troubled field of journalism, or a poison that will irrevocably con-
taminate it? There is little point in debating whether or not metrics have a
place in newsrooms. They are here, and they don’t seem to be going anywhere
anytime soon. At the same time, we must not unthinkingly adopt a technolog-
ically determinist view, in which the very existence of metrics will inevitably
cause certain norms, practices, and structures to emerge. What metrics are do-
ing to—and in—newsrooms is an empirical question, not a foregone conclusion,
and it is the one this report aims to address.
Case Studies and Methods
By looking closely at one analytics company and two media organizations that
use its tool, this research is able to follow both how an analytics dashboard
moves from the company that produces it to those that use it, and also how
very different types of editorial groups integrate the same tool into their work.
Chartbeat is an important and ideal analytics company to study for several
reasons. It has tremendous reach—its clients include 80 percent of the most-
trafficked publishers in the United States, as well as media outlets in 35 other
countries—yet is small enough that it is possible for an ethnographer to get a
feel for the company as a whole. It was also one of the first analytics companies
to make a dashboard specifically designed for use by journalists, rather than
by advertising sales departments. During my time at Chartbeat, the company
was building, marketing, and launching a brand new version of Chartbeat
Publishing, its flagship editorial product; I was able to witness much of this
process take place. From August 2013–January 2014, I spent time as a “fly on
the wall” in Chartbeat’s offices, observing internal meetings, user experience
research, client trainings, and the rhythms of daily office life. I also conducted
22 interviews and in-depth conversations with 16 employeesv who worked on a
mix of teams across the company—from sales and marketing, to engineering, to
product development and tech support.
Gawker Media is a highly popular and visible network of blogs that cov-
ers topics ranging from gaming to sports to women’s issues. Gawker is widely
known as a metrics-driven organization. In the early days of the company,
owner Nick Denton developed a reputation for paying writers partly based on
the page views their posts generated. The company also devised the Big Board
(subsequently built by Chartbeat), a constantly updating screen displaying
v. Some employees were interviewed multiple times over the course of the fieldwork.
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the top stories by traffic across all Gawker Media sites. During the time of my
fieldwork, Gawker gave bonuses based on its sites’ unique visitor counts and
had started publicly ranking individual writers by traffic. Gawker is a longtime
client of Chartbeat and the two companies have a close relationship; while most
of Chartbeat’s clients require that their data be kept confidential, Gawker al-
lows Chartbeat to make its data public for training and other purposes. I con-
ducted 30 interviews with writers and editors from six of Gawker’s eight core
titles, as well as with a small number of editorial and business development
executives. From February–July 2014, I also spent a total of five days observing
the online group chats (conducted on the collaboration software Campfire) of
two of the company’s core sites and attended occasional staff meetings. In addi-
tion, I analyzed the company’s internal memos (some of which staffers provided
to me, others of which were leaked online).
If Gawker is known for being metrics-driven in all decision-making, The
New York Times, at least at first glance, seems to have the opposite rela-
tionship to metrics. For years, representatives of The Times newsroom were
publicly dismissive, even scornful, of the idea of using metrics to inform edi-
torial processes. In the face of the paper’s ongoing financial troubles,6 there
have been some indications that The Times’s culture around metrics may be
changing. Though The Times is a longtime Chartbeat client, it only recently
upgraded from the most basic iteration of the dashboard to the more sophis-
ticated tool Gawker and most other large newsrooms employ. The Times’s
complex and fraught relationship to analytics makes the organization an ex-
cellent case study through which to examine the interactions between metrics
and legacy media practices and values. Between 2011 and 2015, I conducted 23
semi-structured interviews with 20 reporters, columnists, editors, bloggers, and
analysts at The Times.
A Note on Access
Ethnographic observation and in-depth interviews provide valuable insight into
how companies operate. However, it can be difficult to obtain access to cor-
porate environments, and compromises are sometimes necessary to make such
research possible. I was given access to Chartbeat on two conditions: first, that
I would not share clients’ names or data; second, that I would allow the com-
pany to review all direct quotes and transcribed anecdotes from my time at
the office. Of the 29 quotes and field-note excerpts I offered for review, Chart-
beat left 24 unaltered, removed two altogether, and removed a single line or
phrase from three. None of these edits substantially changed the presentation
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of my findings, and the company did not have advance access to any of my
analysis or interpretation of the data. Gawker did not put any such limits on
my access: everything I observed or heard in an interview was fair game for
publication, except in the rare instances when interview subjects requested
that something be off the record. At The Times, I arranged interviews with
individual staffers but was not able to conduct observation in the newsroom. I
guaranteed anonymity to individuals at all three research sites, so real names
and identifying details have been omitted.

Chartbeat and the Making
of Web Analytics
“It’s not the identity of the number [that matters]. It’s the feeling that the
number produces . . . That’s the thing that’s important.”
- Chartbeat employee
Data about audiences has long been a source of distrust—or, at least, indifference—
for journalists. Journalism scholars who conducted fieldwork in newsrooms
during the pre-Internet era found that print journalists took little interest in
audience surveys, circulation data, or even more direct forms of feedback like
letters from readers. Rather than write with a statistically informed picture
of their audience in mind, instead they often relied on archetypes of a typical
audience member—usually a family member—when considering the relevance
of a particular story to readership. They also greatly valued the opinions of
their colleagues and bosses, trusting them far more than the general public to
determine whether a story qualified as good journalism.7
With the advent and spread of the Internet, two things changed. First, the
data got much more sophisticated—meaning, it became far more detailed and
specific and was available much more quickly. Second, changing structural
conditions meant that newsrooms could no longer afford to ignore metrics. As
content became more abundant and previously reliable sources of advertising
revenue dried up, news organizations faced intensifying financial pressures. One
way to win the fierce competition for dwindling ad dollars was to enlarge a
publication’s audience, and metrics developed a reputation as a crucial tool for
doing just that.
Still, the idea of using metrics to inform editorial decision-making was
(and sometimes still is) met with derision, anxiety, and outright hostility by
many journalists. In March 2014, the late Times media columnist David Carr
warned, “Risks Abound as Reporters Play in Traffic.”8 The American Journal-
ism Review asked, “Is Chasing Viral Traffic Hurting Journalism?”9 Even out-
lets that have a reputation for being extremely metrics-driven have voiced con-
cerns. A BuzzFeed headline read, “Infinite Feedback Will Make Us Crazy”;10
a Daily Beast piece on the “anti-clickbait movement” was entitled “Saving Us
from Ourselves.”11
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In this climate, a company determined to get metrics into a wide array of
newsrooms had its work cut out for it. But by many measures, Chartbeat has
succeeded at doing just that. As CEO Tony Haile often points out, the com-
pany works with 80 percent of the highest-trafficked publishers in the United
States, as well as newsrooms in 35 other countries. This makes Chartbeat an
intriguing research site for examining the production of analytics. How does
Chartbeat decide what to count and how to present data? And just as impor-
tant, how does Chartbeat market and sell its product to newsrooms?
The answers I uncovered during my research add complexity to the way we
typically think about what metrics are and the function they serve within news
organizations. In both popular and academic discourse, there is a widespread
tendency to think of metrics as instruments of rationalization—as tools that
systematically and scientifically measure the performance of news content and
convey that information to journalists so that they can draw more traffic to
their sites. Chartbeat often portrays its mission this way: the company’s web-
site boasts that its dashboard allows clients to “see what interests visitors and
adapt your site instantly,” “equip your team with decision-driving data,” and
“know what content sparks and holds readers’ attention.” The client testimoni-
als on Chartbeat’s site also employ dry, technical language. Here is Gawker’s:
“By providing key information in real time, we have a more precise understand-
ing of the traffic we must support as we add features to our next-generation
live blog platform.” The prevailing message is that the dashboard exists to
communicate rational, dispassionate data, upon which journalists can then act.
And indeed, Chartbeat’s analytics tool is designed to communicate data.
The dashboard’s original distinguishing feature was its real-time information
about visitors’ behavior (the name Chartbeat is a play on heartbeat, evoking
this immediacy). The current publishing dashboard (Fig. 1) is packed with
data about readers’ behavior. In a quick glance, one can see how many visitors
are on the site (and on each particular page) at a given moment; the average
amount of time they have been there; which Internet sites referred them; how
often they visit; where in the world they are located; what percentage of them
is looking at the site on mobile phones; and much more.
Fig. 1: A screenshot of Chartbeat’s dashboard for publishers.
But a closer look at the dashboard, coupled with hours of observation and
interviews with the people who dreamt up, built, and marketed it, reveals that
providing rigorous data is only a part—and at times not even the most impor-
tant part—of what the dashboard is designed to do. For Chartbeat to succeed,
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its product must appeal to the journalists whom are its intended audience.
To accomplish that, the dashboard must do much more than merely commu-
nicate data. It must demonstrate deference for traditional journalistic values
and judgment; it must be compelling; it must soften the blow of bad news;
and finally, it must facilitate optimism and the celebration of good news. None
of these things fall under our conventional understanding of what an analyt-
ics tool is and does, yet Chartbeat expends considerable energy and effort on
them. Some of these aims can be accomplished within the actual dashboard;
others, like demonstrating respect for traditional journalistic judgment, are
accomplished both within the dashboard itself and in Chartbeat staff’s interac-
tions with clients.
Communicating Deference to Journalistic Judgment
One of the most popular and widespread suppositions about big data is that
the existence of new sources of data and new ways to process them will obvi-
ate the need for expert intuition and judgment, which has, the narrative goes,
repeatedly proven itself to be unreliable. In a typical example, Economist ed-
itor Kenneth Cukier and Oxford professor Viktor Mayer-Schönberger wrote,
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“the biggest impact of big data will be that data-driven decisions are poised to
augment or overrule human judgment.”12
In journalism’s more traditional corners, there is a fear that metrics will do
more overruling than augmenting. One of the challenges for Chartbeat staff,
then, is to present itself and the company’s products in a way that will assuage
these worries and earn journalists’ trust. The company does this in two ways.
First, staff members rhetorically defer to editors’ judgment— both in verbal
interactions with clients and within marketing materials. In a client meeting
I observed, a Chartbeat employee suggested the client look at data about its
most valuable traffic source and added, “you already know it intrinsically, but
the data confirms it.” (Of course, Chartbeat also has to avoid going too far
with this type of message, lest the dashboard be considered unnecessary.)
The second way in which Chartbeat works to communicate deference and
build trust is with the metrics themselves. The new Chartbeat Publishing
dashboard prominently features two metrics in the top left-hand corner: en-
gaged time, which is an average measure of how long people spend engaged
with a site’s content, and recirculation, which is the percentage of people who
visit at least one additional page on a site after the one at which they arrive.
Just below these figures is a section on visitor frequency, which divides read-
ers into three categories—new, returning, and loyal—based on how often they
visit a site. In explaining the impetus for these particular metrics, Chartbeat
employees and marketing materials position them against page views and other
metrics that have a reputation for incentivizing the production of clickbait.
By contrast, the company argues, Chartbeat’s metrics are designed to reward
“high-quality content,” meaning the kinds of rigorous, thoughtful reporting
and writing that are central to journalists’ professional identity. In a meeting
I observed in which the Chartbeat team prepared for the product launch, the
alignment between Chartbeat Publishing’s metrics and traditional journalis-
tic values was a central selling point. As one employee put it, “this is the core
of what we’re trying to do— reframe an audience from chasing meaningless
metrics and starting out fresh every morning, to building a loyal and returning
audience that [the client] can monetize in a variety of ways.”
Just as noteworthy as which features Chartbeat Publishing includes are
the ones it leaves out. The dashboard doesn’t make recommendations about
what kind of content to produce or where to place content on a page. This
omission is not due to technological limitations or because such a feature would
be ineffective at growing clients’ traffic; rather, it is a conscious attempt to
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avoid alienating journalists. When asked about Chartbeat’s strategy, a member
of the development team explained:
We had a competitor who made a tool that made suggestions to editors . . . And
it was like, “put this here, promote this story.” And editors were like, “I’m not
using this damn thing . . . You’re telling me to put stuff in the lead spot I would
never put there.” So we said, “listen, we’re not taking away your job; we’re
enhancing your ability to make those decisions.”
Indeed, an anecdote about a Chartbeat competitor that exemplified this
dynamic was invoked so frequently in internal meetings and interviews that I
began to consider it part of the company folklore. At the Guardian Changing
Media Summit in 2013, the digital editor of the British tabloid The Sun served
on a panel with the founder and CEO of Visual Revenue, a predictive analytics
company that provides algorithmic recommendations to news organizations
about story placement and assignment. In speaking about his experiences using
the product, Derek Brown, The Sun editor, said:
It’s a really valuable tool, but the one thing I’ve always said to Dennis [founder
and CEO of Visual Revenue] . . . is that you kind of have to ignore it some-
times. Great example, last week: New Pope [was elected, and] Visual Revenue
is telling us, screaming at us, “nobody is interested in this story! They’re far
more interested in the Katy Perry story. Put that above the Pope. Put the
Pope way down at the bottom of your home page. Nobody really wants to read
it on your website.” And of course, at that point—and there’s lots of exam-
ples of that every day of the week—the human being has to intervene and say,
“okay, they may be more interested in Katy Perry in a bikini today. However,
the Pope is a far more important story.”13
That an editor at The Sun, a tabloid newspaper, so frequently found Visual
Revenue’s recommendations inappropriate is indicative of the fraught relation-
ship that news organizations of all stripes can have with analytics companies.
At Chartbeat, “Katy Perry versus the Pope” (as the story was sometimes re-
ferred to during meetings) was a powerful symbol. This was in part because,
as one staff member put it, “we don’t feel that’s how data should be used.”
But it also served as a cautionary tale of the kind of overstepping that could
damage an analytics company’s credibility with news organizations. The story
became a vivid reminder of the delicate balance Chartbeat had to strike with
clients. The company needs to show that data has something to contribute to
decision-making without stepping on editorial toes.
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The Candy and Vegetables of Metrics
With metrics like recirculation, visitor frequency, and engaged time, Chartbeat
demonstrates its allegiance to journalistic values and gains journalists’ trust.
However, none of these is the metric that many users find most compelling, nor
for which the company is most famous. That would be “concurrent visitors,”
and more specifically, the speedometer-like dial that shows how many people
are on a site on a second-by-second basis. The dial and accompanying num-
ber’s constant movement give it a mesmerizing quality, leading users to call it
“sanity-ruining,”14 “addictive,” and “the crack cocaine of web data.”15 Chart-
beat staffers expressed mixed feelings about this. An interaction I had with one
employee illustrates this ambivalence:
CP: From my conversations with editors about this tool, they always say it’s
addictive. Do you think it [is because the Chartbeat dashboard] sort of speaks to
an editorial mindset? Do you think that the engaged-time thing is the reason
why editors have taken to it?
I wish I could say yes, but no . . . I think the reason they find it addictive is—
one is just performance. It’s such a fucking tough industry that you lose sleep,
man. Like being a journalist is the hardest job in the world. It’s so stressful
that you are constantly worrying about whether you’re getting enough traffic or
not. So your eyes are glued to Chartbeat because your life depends on it. So I
don’t have any real illusions about what got us in the door. That’s why they’re
addicted. Now, we’re trying to be much, much more than that, obviously. And
we all need to be a bit more honest about our actual value in some of these
organizations right now, because there’s nothing more than that to some people.
Indeed, Chartbeat employees themselves were not immune to the dial’s
seductive properties. As one staffer who sometimes writes for the company’s
blog explained:
The whole real-time thing, like to me that’s the whole thing that makes it
work as a product. You know, I write blog posts and I watch it. Those are the
moments when you realize why it’s a successful product, because I watch it, and
nobody reads my stuff, right? . . . If you look at it, you’re like, “there are three
people reading this.” . . . And then somebody else comes in and you’re like, “oh,
shit, there’s a fourth! Who’s that guy?!” And that’s the magic.
As the next section will demonstrate, my findings at Gawker confirmed that
many writers and editors largely ignore those Chartbeat metrics designed to
reward high-quality content in favor of the concurrents dial, which is the clos-
est thing Chartbeat has to more typical metrics like page views and uniques.
There is a disjuncture, then, between the metrics on which Chartbeat builds its
Chartbeat and the Making of Web Analytics 29
reputation as an analytics company that supports serious journalism and the
metrics that are actually most popular and alluring to many users. Ironically,
Chartbeat finds itself in a situation similar to many of its publisher-clients, who
are torn between producing “vegetable” content (nourishing but relatively un-
popular) and “candy” content (empty but fun and, yes, addictive). In this vein,
Chartbeat has vegetable metrics, such as engaged time and visitor frequency,
which contribute to its prestige and to clients’ sense that Chartbeat “gets it.”
But the dashboard also has candy metrics, like the concurrents dial, which give
the dashboard its addictive properties.
Sheltering Clients from Bad News and
Providing Opportunities to Celebrate Good News
As Chartbeat and other analytics tools become more common and influen-
tial in newsrooms, journalists’ sense of dignity, pride, and self-worth are in-
creasingly tied up in their traffic numbers. Metrics have earned a reputation
as ego-busters, as journalists discover that their readership is considerably
smaller and less engaged than they imagined. In meetings and calls I observed,
clients called Chartbeat data points on their dashboard “sad” and “super pride-
crushing.” Clients’ feelings about their data can become inseparable from
their feelings about Chartbeat. An employee who works with smaller, lower-
trafficked publishers said the experience of looking at the dashboard can be
“harsh,” adding that some elect to stop using Chartbeat before finishing their
free trial.
A few Chartbeat employees saw themselves as providers of tough love. One
said he tells clients that “facing the low numbers is the first step towards boost-
ing them.” However, in conversations with clients, Chartbeat generally tended
to shy away from the role of a purveyor of uncomfortable truths, in large part
because the company didn’t want clients to develop negative associations with
the product. In meetings and trainings, employees often took a positive tone,
even when discussing disappointing or unimpressive numbers. During one train-
ing, an employee displayed a graph showing that very few visitors went to a
second page on the client’s site after the one on which they’d landed. The em-
ployee said that, despite appearances, this wasn’t actually bad, because the
client’s landing page had so much to do and look at. “People stay on your
landing page,” he encouraged. There were several other instances in which em-
ployees were quick to reassure clients that a particular metric wasn’t as bad as
30 COLUMBIA JOURNALISM SCHOOL | TOW CENTER FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM
it seemed or to redirect clients’ attention from an underwhelming metric to a
stronger one.
In addition to trying to take the edge off disappointing metrics, Chartbeat
also actively facilitates opportunities for optimism—both in interactions with
clients and in the dashboard itself. When describing the considerations that
went into the new dashboard, one employee said:
You know, celebrate was one thing. That needs a place in [the product].
CP: When something goes well—
Yeah, yeah! Should we, in our product, be helping them celebrate more, or
telling them when to?
Nowhere is the importance of celebration clearer than in the case of the
“broken dial.” Chartbeat is priced so that each client has a cap of concurrent
visitors that it has paid for; if the number of visitors on its site exceeds that
number, the dial “breaks”—that is, the client will see that the dial and the
number of concurrents have hit the cap, but the dashboard will not show by
how much the cap has been exceeded. The broken dial sometimes results in
an upsell, as clients who repeatedly hit their cap can pay to raise it. But even
when the broken dial doesn’t directly lead to greater revenue, it has a valu-
able emotional impact on clients. When the cap is exceeded, one employee
explained, “the dial looks incorrect . . . The product is broken, but in a fun way.
If you didn’t have that sort of excitement, it wouldn’t work.”
One client, during a product testing session, articulated just how powerful
such excitement can be and how central it is to Chartbeat’s appeal. She said
that her news organization had briefly considered discontinuing its account
with Chartbeat in favor of a rival analytics service, but within a few days had
“crawled [their] way back” to Chartbeat. The Chartbeat employee conducting
the session asked, “what is it, do you think, that was the most compelling
aspect of Chartbeat?” The client answered:
First of all, if you’re into traffic as most sites are, seeing that big number [re-
cites number of concurrents on her site—750], that’s a really good number. And
we’re capped at 2,000 concurrent users, so if we always think—if we’re at 1,999,
we always imagine we’re at 2,450 or 5,150, but we probably [just] can’t see it
’cause we’re capped. So we always have that kind of illusion, like that optimism
going on.vi
vi. The numbers appearing here are pseudonumerals, not the client’s actual metrics. Part of
my access agreement with Chartbeat was that I would not disclose client names or data. The
numbers I use here, however, are proportionally similar to the actual ones.
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For this client, the broken dial did exactly the opposite of what we typically
think of as the role of metrics: Rather than providing unvarnished information
about her audience, it allowed her and her team to imagine an audience size
that was more than twice the size of their cap, regardless of whether or not the
imagined number had any basis in reality. In this instance, Chartbeat’s role
as a facilitator of optimism and celebration has taken precedence over its self-
described mission to provide readers with an accurate picture of their traffic.
Importantly, this is not an oversight on the company’s part but a strategic
choice that renders the product more appealing. As an employee put it:
When [a client] does hit a home run, and you see the Chartbeat dial go up, and
you see the red line go up, then that euphoria— Chartbeat gets to be part of
that experience. So as long as we’re in the room, like high-fiving you, then we
get a lot of positive association with that moment.
These findings all contribute to a larger point: While we tend to think of
analytics dashboards as a rationalizing force in newsrooms, a tool that applies
rigorous, objective quantitative methods in place of the unreliable, unscientific
guesswork of the past, it turns out that Chartbeat’s dashboard is designed to
play a social and emotional role in newsrooms just as much as a rational one.
Everything—from the types of data the dashboard provides, to the features
it doesn’t include, to the way in which data is presented, to the interactions
between staff and clients—is profoundly influenced by Chartbeat’s need to earn
journalists’ trust, prevent them from becoming demoralized, and provide them
with an appealing product. Indeed, the company’s very survival depends on
its ability to be something editors actually want to use. This is not to say that
Chartbeat’s methods for measuring audience behavior are in some way flawed
or not objective, or that the company intentionally or cynically manipulates
its clients. To the contrary, Chartbeat’s methods are widely considered to
be quite rigorous, and most of the staff members with whom I spoke seemed
wholly genuine in their belief that Chartbeat’s metrics support and reward
high-quality journalism. Rather, the goal here is to illustrate that Chartbeat’s
metrics— indeed, all metrics!—are the outcome of human choices and that
these choices are in turn influenced by a range of organizational, economic, and
social factors.

Analytics at Gawker Media
“I’m actually concerned by the extent to which my emotional well-being is
dictated by the number of hits on my posts. I talk to my therapist about it!”
- Gawker Media writer
There is arguably no contemporary media organization more strongly asso-
ciated with a metrics-driven editorial culture than Gawker. Throughout its
13-year history, Gawker has put a strong emphasis on numbers, though the
company has prioritized different metrics at different times (most notably
in 2010, when it switched from a focus on page views to one on unique visi-
tors). Gawker’s focus on metrics was intended to not only boost profits, but
also to serve as a positioning device that—along with its sharp, mocking voice
and willingness to pay for scoops— set it against the media establishment. At
Gawker, metrics have been:
• Prominent: The company famously pioneered the Big Board, a constantly
updating screen that hangs over the reception desk on the editorial floor at
its Nolita offices. The board, populated by Chartbeat data, displays the top
posts by concurrent visitors across all of the sites in the Gawker network.
Shortly before I began my research at Gawker, the Big Board was supple-
mented by a leaderboard that ranks the top writers (staff and non-staff)
on Kinja, Gawker’s publishing platform, by the number of unique visitors
they have brought to the site in the previous 30 days. Red and green arrows,
showing whether individual writers are ascending or descending in the ranks,
reinforced the message.
• Public: Gawker is known for its transparency, and many of the company’s
metrics are publicly available online, including the Kinja leaderboard16 and
graphs17 showing each staff writer’s daily, weekly, and monthly contribu-
tion to her site’s unique visitors and page views. Tallies of page views and
unique visitors are also displayed alongside the byline of each post. In addi-
tion, while most of Chartbeat’s clients keep their data proprietary, Gawker
allows Chartbeat to use its data in training sessions and demos with new
and prospective clients, cementing the company’s reputation as being heavily
traffic-driven.
• Powerful: The company has experimented with a range of traffic-based
pay-for-performance schemes over the years. The one in place at the time
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of my research operated like this: Each site had a monthly growth target
of unique visitors, calculated based on its recent traffic. Thus, the sites had
different targets depending on their past audience size, but they were all
expected to have the same rate of growth. When a site exceeded its target,
it received a proportional bonus that the site lead (Gawker’s term for editor-
in-chief) could dispense among her writers as she saw fit.vii While monthly
bonuses were based on collective traffic, individual traffic numbers were
also influential. The company calculates something called an eCPM for all
editorial staffers, which is the measure of how many dollars an employee
earns in salary for every 1,000 unique visitors her posts bring into the site.
Writers were expected to maintain an eCPM no higher than $20, and those
whose eCPMs exceeded this for a prolonged period were in danger of being
fired. Raises were also closely tied to individual traffic numbers; writers
had to demonstrate sustained growth in personal traffic that was roughly
proportionate to the raise they were requesting.viii
This metrics-driven approach has paid off: the company’s estimated value is
around $250 million; in 2014, it pulled in $45 million in revenue and $6.7 mil-
lion in profit.18 But the period I spent at Gawker was a tumultuous one, even
for a company that is known for being constantly in flux. Gawker faces fierce
competition from companies like BuzzFeed, Vice, and Vox Media, and Denton
was trying to move the company away from a singular focus on maximizing
traffic and toward a more collaborative, interactive type of journalism.
This moment in Gawker Media’s history lent itself to two major questions:
First, if Gawker was indeed an extreme example of the kind of metrics-driven
approach that media organizations are increasingly adopting, what was it like
for writers and editors to work in this environment? What effect do prominent,
public, powerful metrics have on their work and morale, and what might this
vii. For instance, if a site surpassed its target by 12 percent, the site’s bonus amount for
that month would be 12 percent of the site’s monthly budget. Bonuses were capped at 20
percent of the site’s monthly budget, though some sites routinely surpassed their growth
target by far more than 20 percent.
viii. As is discussed in greater depth in the conclusion, Gawker shifted its policies around
metrics as I was writing this report. Under the leadership of newly appointed executive ed-
itor Tommy Craggs (who formerly edited Deadspin, Gawker’s sports site) the company has,
at least for the moment, abandoned some of its traffic incentives (such as the uniques-based
bonus system) and made metrics less prominent in the newsroom. However, some remnants
of the previous system remain, such as the Big Board and traffic counts on individual posts.
It is too soon to tell whether Gawker’s diminished emphasis on metrics represents a perma-
nent shift or merely a short-term experiment. Either way, the metrics-driven period I studied
makes for a valuable case study, as analytics become increasingly prominent, public, and
powerful at a wide range of news organizations.
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tell us about the future of digital media as it becomes increasingly measurable
and measured? The second question had to do with Gawker’s attempt to pivot
away from an exclusively traffic-focused model toward a more interactive and
collaborative style of journalism. Much has been written about the struggles
of legacy media organizations attempting to adapt to the digital age. But we
know less about how digitally native media companies cope with changes in
their missions, business models, or field of competitors. What does change look
like at a digital media company like Gawker?
The Experience of Working at Gawker
Talking to Gawker writers and editors about metrics, it was immediately clear
that traffic data was a central feature of the organizational culture.ix Most
writers and editors consulted the Big Board regularly and looked at the counts
of page views and unique visitors that appear next to each of their posts.
Those who checked Chartbeat frequently directed most of their attention to
the count of concurrent visitors as an early indicator of whether a post was go-
ing to “blow up” or “take off” (meaning, garner lots of uniques). Almost no one
mentioned Chartbeat’s other metrics, such as engaged time, recirculation, or
visitor frequency. When I explicitly asked about such metrics, a few staffers re-
ported consulting them, but the typical response was one of indifference. Writ-
ers and editors who did look at these metrics were not always hoping for the
sustained audience engagement that Chartbeat’s tool is designed to measure.
For instance, the concurrent visitor count can be boosted by a higher number
of people reading a post or by each person’s spending a longer time reading
it. Thus, some staffers said they found it disappointing if a post had a large
number of concurrent visitors and high engaged time, as it meant the post was
not bringing in as many uniques as the concurrent visitors number seemed to
indicate. Similarly, a high proportion of frequently returning visitors, intended
ix. This sentiment was voiced at all levels of the editorial hierarchy, from editorial fellows
(Gawker’s new term for people who are, essentially, paid interns) to site leads. Several site
leads said they did not want their teams to be overly focused on metrics and that they took
care to shield writers from their own anxieties about traffic. During the days I spent sitting
in on two sites’ group chats, metrics were never openly discussed. Still, the broader orga-
nizational culture of Gawker, where metrics were on the wall, on each individual post, and
available to all editorial employees through tools like Quantcast and Chartbeat, undercut site
leads’ attempts to buffer their writers from traffic pressures. Said one site lead about his writ-
ers consulting Chartbeat: “I kind of wish they would be at peace with the fact that while it’s
available, they shouldn’t look at it, because please just do a good job and let me stress about
that . . . But I can’t say, ’forget that password that you found out’ . . . How would I tell them
not to [look at metrics]?”
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to indicate that a site is building the coveted “loyal and returning audience,”
could be considered a negative at Gawker, because the company (and, perhaps
more to the point, its advertisers) put such a high premium on drawing in new
people.
Data about uniques inspired strong feelings at Gawker. Staffers admitted
to feeling “depressed,” “upset,” “worried,” and “desperate” when their traffic
or their site’s traffic was low. The flip side, of course, was that getting excep-
tionally high traffic felt validating, even exhilarating. But the thrill of a hit
story was inevitably fleeting: because monthly traffic targets were based on a
site’s past performance, high historical traffic meant even higher expectations
for future traffic. Even when you were doing well, you could always be doing—
and, indeed, were expected to do—even better. One site lead described this
unceasing pressure:
It can be quite taxing. I find that the start of every month in my life for the
last two years has been stressful, because I start with maybe some of that
terror that I had when I was [first] thinking about what it would be like to be
a newspaper reporter . . . “What am I gonna write about?” Well now it’s, come
March 1st, “well, hope we do as well in March as we did in February.”
A writer described a similar feeling, which he linked to Chartbeat specifi-
cally:
Chartbeat is rough because it’s relentless. There’s never gonna be a time when
you can close your MacBook and be like, Chartbeat’s all set, our traffic’s good,
we’re ready to go. You can always do something else, or post something else to
Facebook to see if it sticks, or try tweeting a story again to see if maybe it’ll get
pickup now instead of this morning.
The never-ending cycle of highs and lows, facilitated by real-time analytics
tools like Chartbeat and expressed materially in bonuses and raises (or the
lack thereof), meant that working in editorial at Gawker could be an emotional
roller coaster. In the words of a site lead:
When traffic is just average or low, or if we have a really spikey period and it
goes down to what it was pre-spike, I get upset. I feel like I’m not good at my
job . . . I notice it all the time.
The ups and downs could also be highly addictive. Some staffers made ex-
plicit analogies to drugs when discussing metrics. The writer who called Chart-
beat “relentless” also admitted to having been a “Chartbeat addict” at pre-
vious digital media jobs. He said he was trying to limit his exposure to the
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dashboard, with limited success: “At Gawker Media it’s like I’m a cocaine ad-
dict on vacation in Colombia.” Others compared the perpetual hunt for traffic
to playing a game or gambling.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that when I would ask staffers what per-
sonal qualities were needed to thrive at Gawker, nearly all of them mentioned
competitiveness. As an editor succinctly put it, “if you aren’t hard-working
or hyper-competitive, I can’t imagine how you would work here.” Several em-
ployees cited their backgrounds in extracurricular sports and video gaming
as experiences that had prepared them for Gawker’s company culture. While
Gawker’s reputation for being metrics-driven undoubtedly causes it to attract
already competitive employees, the looming presence of the Big Board and the
Kinja leaderboard in the office intensified this trait and, as one writer put it,
“massaged [it] into productivity.”
But the leaderboards ranking stories and staffers don’t just harness employ-
ees’ competitive tendencies; they shape the very nature of competition in the
media field, namely by turning it further inward. In Deciding What’s News,
his 1980 ethnography of Time, Newsweek, CBS, and NBC, sociologist Her-
bert Gans documented the extreme lengths to which these rival magazines and
news networks would go trying to outpace each other in scoops and audience
growth.19 To be sure, Gawker Media employees saw their company as com-
peting with other large or rapidly growing digital media entities, such as Buz-
zFeed, Vox Media, and Vice Media. But in everyday work life, staffers generally
did not compare their individual sites to rival, similarly themed sites; rather,
the prevalence of metrics in the newsroom meant that most of their competitive
zeal was focused on other Gawker sites, even when these sites covered vastly
different subject matter.
Of course, newsrooms have always had competitive internal dynamics. But
metrics can highlight and intensify them. For instance, a staffer at Jezebel,
Gawker’s site devoted to feminism and women’s issues, fervently wanted to
surpass the traffic of Deadspin, the sports site, but evinced only an abstract
curiosity about the traffic of other women’s sites, like XOJane. This is largely
attributable to the fact that Gawker Media employees did not generally know
the traffic figures of other companies’ sites beyond the broadest strokes or
estimates. A staffer at Kotaku, Gawker’s gaming site, explained:
I don’t even know what other gaming sites are doing. I also don’t care, because
I know that this sports site [Deadspin] and this politics and celebrity gossip site
[Gawker] and this tech site [Gizmodo] that are part of my company . . . I know
how well they’re doing. I see how much they’re growing every month. And if
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sites about all these other topics can grow to the extent that they’re growing,
then why can’t my site?
It is striking that an employee at a site with a relatively niche audience
would hold it to the same standard of growth as sites about more mainstream
topics like consumer technology or celebrity gossip. But the intention of the Big
Board and the Kinja leaderboard was precisely to render seemingly dissimilar
sites and writers comparable according to the same metric and thereby place
them in competition. This dynamic occasionally caused bad blood between
coworkers and resentment from the smaller sites. During the time I spent in
the online group chat of one of the company’s smaller sites, writers expressed
annoyance that a writer for a larger site had published a post about a video
their site had covered first, rather than simply “splicing” their post (and thus
ensuring that their site got the additional traffic).
Given the prominence, publicness, and power of metrics at Gawker, what
kinds of actions did editors and writers take to boost their numbers? My re-
search revealed three main effects of Gawker’s metrics-driven culture. First,
writers and editors had a tendency to go with what works, or had proven to
work in the past. A writer ticked off the types of posts that reliably “do well”
on her site: “People love unhinged letters . . . Unhinged sorority girl! Unhinged
bride! [Or], ‘look at what this douchebag wrote me,’ . . . And people like cute
things that kids did. People like heartwarming videos with inter-species friend-
ships.” In the event that a post outside the realm of surefire traffic-getters
became a surprise hit, a site would try to follow up on it or replicate it. One
site lead, after being shocked by the traffic garnered by a short post about the
upcoming series finale of a popular TV show, told the writer to do a follow-up
post immediately after the final episode aired: “[I said], ’I need you to cover
this first thing in the morning. I don’t care what you write, but you need to
cover it.’ ”
Second, writers posted very frequently. While most staffers could rattle off
a list of topics that could be counted on to get good traffic, many also stressed
that traffic could be highly unpredictable. Nearly everyone I spoke to could
cite examples of posts whose traffic far exceeded—or, in a few cases, gravely
disappointed—expectations. This element of randomness or surprise meant
that the only way to guarantee higher traffic—both individual and site-wide—
was to post as much as possible. Many sites had adopted this strategy. As a
writer put it, “it’s more or less like playing the lottery. You pick your numbers
and you’re diligent about it and the more lottery tickets you buy, the more
likely you are to hit it big.”
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As this writer acknowledged, though, there were costs associated with fre-
quent posting: “[Traffic] compels me to produce more. However, producing
more, blogging more, keeping the post count up, necessarily means that I don’t
take time to work on the longer, slower, reported-out features.” This was a
recurring theme. Site leads said they were happy when writers did manage
to produce longer features or essays, even when these were unlikely to attract
major traffic. Yet they acknowledged that this could cause problems. In the
words of one site lead: “Sometimes there are things that are really long beauti-
ful pieces that are very thought out and only do 10,000 uniques over 24 hours,
and that kinda sucks. But I wouldn’t change it. It’s just the pressure now to be
like, OK, what are we gonna do now to make up for that?”
The extensiveness of metrics-driven employee monitoring could easily give
the impression that Gawker was an oppressive work environment. Some com-
mentators and reporters have characterized Nick Denton as running a “digital
sweatshop”; listening to writers and editors speak about their efforts to keep
pace with growth expectations, it was not hard to see why. Yet some staffers
had turned down offers from legacy media organizations where there was far
less of an emphasis on traffic; others had left Gawker for such organizations
only to subsequently return to the company. This pattern has become so com-
mon that Capital New York gave it a name: the Gawker boomerang.20 When
staffers were asked why they return, or why they chose to build their careers
at Gawker in the first place, the answer was nearly always the same: writers
and editors cherish the freedom and autonomy they feel they have at Gawker.
When John Cook departed from Pierre Omidyar’s embattled First Look Me-
dia, he tweeted, “there’s more autonomy at gawker than any other editorial
shop, First Look or otherwise—that’s the operational principle.”21 A writer
I interviewed explained why she had decided to turn down job offers at two
well-known magazines:
[At Gawker] you’re really visible and you’re allowed to be yourself. And I think
that’s one of the great things about writing for any of the Gawker sites, is that
they encourage you to have an opinion and to have a voice. Whereas at [one of
these magazines], they’d be like, “be yourself, but be yourself through us.”
A site lead who had returned to Gawker after working in magazines echoed
this point: “Nick lets us do whatever we want. We can write whatever we want.
We can take the site wherever we need to go.”
Obviously, the Gawker staff is a self-selecting group: those who apply, get
hired, and stay at the company (or return to it), are unlikely to find met-
rics overly oppressive or debilitating. Even so, Gawker’s multiple systems of
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metrics-driven monitoring could make employees’ paeans to their editorial au-
tonomy seem hollow or even deluded. After all, site leads were free to take
their sites “wherever they need to go” only as long as they kept their traffic
numbers up. But to see employees’ perceptions of editorial autonomy as a form
of false consciousness oversimplifies the issues at stake. Statements like Cook’s
raise a broader question: what is the meaning of editorial freedom in a digital
media landscape saturated with metrics? Many online-only media companies,
including Gawker, have dispensed with, or at least scaled back, the stylistic and
ethical norms of twentieth-century journalistic professionalism, such as objectiv-
ity, nonpartisanship, and the prohibition on paying for scoops. They also tend
to have a flatter organizational structure than legacy media organizations, such
that writers face far less editorial oversight. Yet such freedoms coexist with lev-
els of metrics-driven surveillance that would be unthinkable at more traditional
news organizations like The Times. This suggests that the contemporary digital
media landscape encompasses multiple conceptions of editorial freedom— and
those who populate it have conflicting notions of what constitutes the most
onerous constraints for working journalists.
Changing a Metrics-driven Culture
Can be as Difficult as Changing a Legacy One
The centrality of metrics to Gawker’s organizational culture meant that behav-
iors that were hard to quantify were also hard to incentivize. This came across
most clearly in discussions of Kinja, Gawker’s publishing platform. Kinja,
which allows users not only to comment on posts on Gawker sites but also to
publish independent posts of their own, was born out of Denton’s vision of col-
laborative journalism—the idea, in short, that the best stories emerge not from
the dogged efforts of a lone reporter but from the collective work of a writer
and her devoted audience, which provides tips, serves as valuable sources, en-
gages in spirited debate, or moves the story forward in other ways.
For Denton’s vision to be realized, Gawker staffers had to be highly in-
teractive with their audience in the comments section of each post. But this
presented a major problem for Gawker’s management. Over the years, em-
ployees had been conditioned to use numbers as an important gauge of their
job performance, yet interactions on Kinja were not easily quantified. There
were attempts to do so: During my time at Gawker, then-editorial director
Joel Johnson emailed each site’s editorial staff about a new policy that writers
were expected to participate in the comments section of at least 80 percent of
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their posts (and called out, by name, those who had failed to meet the target).
However, there was no systematic way to measure or quantify the quality of
these interactions, and some writers told me it was easy to hit the 80 percent
target by responding to comments with, “great point!” or a similarly superficial
contribution. To spend more time engaging with commenters, they said, would
decrease their post count, which could, in turn, depress their number of unique
visitors and their site’s chance of getting a bonus.
To address these tensions, Gawker executives introduced a “Kinja bonus,”
modeled after the uniques bonus, in an effort to boost writers’ engagement with
the comments. But there was no transparent, mathematical way of allocating
the Kinja bonus, which led writers and site leads to question its legitimacy and
fairness. As one site lead explained:
Every site gets 1 percent or 2 percentx or maybe 0 percent of their monthly
budget if there’s been good Kinja participation, which, how is that judged?
Well, they don’t actually have a way to count this yet. So this metrics-driven
company is in this position where they value this thing because, in theory, it
will lead to greater health for the platform and the company, but they have no
numerical proof for it.
Even if Gawker managed to make the expectations and incentives around
Kinja interaction more straightforward and transparent, my interviews in-
dicated that staffers would continue to resist the shift from a focus on mass
traffic to a focus on interaction. Many writers and site leads had fraught, if
not downright hostile, relationships with commenters. Said one editor when
asked about commenters: “I hate them. So much. I fucking hate them. I’ve
always hated them. They’re the worst.” Writers and editors alike complained
about finding themselves on the receiving end of a daily onslaught of negative
or critical comments—and for female employees or employees of color, these
could veer into harassment and threats. Some writers coped by avoiding com-
ments altogether. This group was particularly dismayed by the new focus on
Kinja interaction; they felt as though they were being told that enduring daily
harassment was now a part of their job.xi
x. The Kinja bonus was capped at 2 percent of a site’s monthly budget, far short of the 20
percent cap for the uniques bonus. To many employees, this indicated that despite Denton’s
insistence to the contrary, traffic—measured in uniques—was still the company’s true priority.
xi. This issue came to a head when anonymous Kinja users began posting GIFs of violent
pornography in the comments sections of Jezebel posts. In the interest of guaranteeing tip-
sters’ anonymity, Gawker does not save commenters’ IP addresses, which meant that those
banned by the Jezebel staff simply returned using new aliases. This went on for months, until
in August of 2014 the Jezebel staff published a post entitled “We Have a Rape Gif Prob-
lem and Gawker Media Won’t Do Anything About It.” (Jezebel staff, “We Have a Rape Gif
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Interestingly, some employees turned to metrics as a way to counter the
psychological toll of negative comments. As the editor lead who has “always
hated” commenters put it:
We broke 9,000 [concurrent visitors] earlier today, so that was awesome. I take
screen cap[ture]s of that. That is a reminder that I can do this . . . It doesn’t
matter if I have someone screaming at me [on Twitter] at 7:30 in the morning.
I’m good at my job . . . And if [my site] was really downhill, more and more
people wouldn’t be reading it!
For writers facing the hostility of online commenters, traffic numbers can
operate as a source not of stress but of solace and validation.xii For them to
function in this way, however, there must be a high correlation between pop-
ularity and quality: If a story (or a site) draws a large and growing audience,
something about it must be good. Staffers, especially those looking to traffic
to bolster their morale in the face of negative comments, bought into this line
of reasoning, but only to a certain extent. For instance, they saw Gawker as
having more editorial integrity than sites like Upworthy and BuzzFeed, both of
which draw enormous audiences, often characterizing them as shameless and
cynical traffic-panderers. A writer who had previously worked for The Huffing-
ton Post decried the tricks that site uses to get people to click on headlines. I
asked him if by this he meant the kind of search-engine optimization tactics for
which The Huffington Post is famous. He replied:
SEO type stuff, but more like headline tricks, tweet tricks, [all of which were
a] precursor to the awfulness that is Upworthy. Like all those tricks work and
Problem and Gawker Media Won’t Do Anything About It,” Jezebel, 11 Aug. 2014, http :
//jezebel .com/we- have- a- rape- gif- problem- and- gawker- media- wont- do- any- 1619384265
) In response, the company reintroduced a commenting system it had once abandoned, by
which only comments from Kinja accounts staff members had previously approved would be
automatically visible under posts. (J. Coen, “What Gawker Media Is Doing About Our Rape
Gif Problem,” Jezebel, 13 Aug. 2014, http : / / jezebel . com / what - gawker - media - is - doing -
about- our- rape- gif- problem- 1620742504 ) The saga highlighted several of the key challenges
for media companies trying to build an interaction-focused model, from the often frightening
harassment women writing online endure to the role of anonymity in enabling both valuable
free expression and trolling.
xii. My conversation with Craggs suggested that a similar dynamic might come into play
as he and the other members of the newly formed Gawker “Politburo”—a team of top edi-
torial staffers—begin to evaluate which sites merit monthly bonuses based on their content.
When some editors questioned the Politburo’s ability to fairly and accurately assess posts
on subjects in which they were not expert, Craggs explained his response: “My case to them
was, ‘look, last year, Facebook determined your bonus. Do you trust Facebook more than
you trust me and the members of the Politburo, who’ve been working at Gawker Media for a
while, and who know what kinds of stories are good?’ And the funny thing is, I think some
people privately, to themselves, probably said, ‘yeah we probably trust Facebook more than
the sports guy.’ ”
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they’ll get you traffic, but more mature sites, Gawker media sites, realize that
there has to be a balance between playing to the numbers but also paying
attention to quality, and having some really simple rules in place as to what you
will and will not do for traffic.
In his much-discussed post “On Smarm,” Gawker.com editor Tom Scocca
argued that Upworthy and BuzzFeed, both top Gawker competitors for social
traffic, epitomize smarminess online, defined by Scocca as “a kind of perfor-
mance, an assumption of the forms of seriousness, of virtue, of constructiveness,
without the substance.”22 Denton, in his 2013 year-end memo, acknowledged
that Gawker was “not completely averse to crowd-pleasing,” but called Buz-
zFeed and Upworthy “the most shameless” in their ploys to get traffic, adding
“the crowd will eventually choose the juicy truth over a heartwarming hoax.”23
These efforts at organizational differentiation and self-definition lay bare the
lack of profession-wide standards of conduct and ethics regarding efforts to
draw traffic: terms like “clickbait” and “shameless” are vague enough for rival
actors to apply to different behaviors in the digital media landscape.

Analytics at The New York Times
“It’s very easy for everybody to read their own agenda into the numbers.”
- New York Times editor
If Gawker is an organization whose culture is steeped in metrics, The New York
Times is the opposite: an organization whose 164-year history, prestigious rep-
utation, and majority single-family ownership have long buffered its newsroom
from the kinds of commercial considerations that metrics represent. In past
years, representatives of The Times have publicly taken a dismissive posture
toward metrics. “We believe readers come to us for our judgment, not the judg-
ment of the crowd,” said former executive editor Bill Keller in 2010. “We’re not
’American Idol.’ ”24 At the same time, the paper has undergone well-publicized
financial struggles over the past several years. The Times has engaged in a va-
riety of cost-cutting measures—including multiple rounds of newsroom buyouts
and layoffs—and efforts to boost revenues, such as the introduction of premium
products and its famous metered paywall.
The confluence of The Times’s longstanding culture and its current eco-
nomic reality has led to a fraught relationship with metrics. In The Times
newsroom, the use of metrics was:
• Restricted: Though The Times subscribes to several analytics tools, such
as Chartbeat and Google Analytics, only staffers in certain roles and depart-
ments were authorized to view them. Similarly, while the most-emailed list
is publicly viewable on The Times website, only a small number of staffers
received a regular email showing how many times each story on the list had
been emailed. Access to analytics was largely aligned with staff hierarchy—
as a general rule, editors could see metrics and reporters could not. However,
there were exceptions: some relatively junior online staffers (e.g., web pro-
ducers) had access to analytics, and access was more widely distributed in
online-only departments, such as interactive news.
• Discretionary: It was largely left up to those staffers who had access to
metrics to decide how (if at all) they wanted to consult and use them. There
were no newsroom-wide expectations around metrics, nor were there for-
malized systems for asking questions of data or drawing conclusions from
it.
• Rare: With the exception of online-only items such as blogs and interactive
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features, audience metrics did not play a major role in editorial decision-
making at The Times. For instance, while page one placements were a part
of reporters’ yearly evaluations, online metrics (including home page place-
ments) were not.
To be sure, The Times is unique—or at least, atypical—in many respects.
But the organization’s extraordinary prestige and strong sense of journalistic
professionalism, coupled with its ongoing financial challenges, mean that highly
relevant questions about editorial metrics appear in especially sharp relief at
The Times. These range from the simple (What do metrics mean? Who should
be in charge of interpreting them?) to the complex (How can journalists take
metrics into account without sacrificing their professional integrity and sense of
civic responsibility? What is the right balance to strike?).
The Thinking Behind Restricted Access to Metrics
At a time when even legacy newspapers like The Washington Post have screens
showing traffic numbers in the newsroom, The Times newsroom is notable for
the conspicuous absence of such displays. While editors had access to analytics
tools, including Chartbeat, reporters did not. Some reporters I spoke with were
indifferent about how metrics rated their work, but many expressed a desire to
see traffic data:
I don’t easily know how many people click on my stories. I would be curious to
know that but I don’t have a way of easily knowing.
I would love to know [by] what paragraph my readers start to give up on me,
because you know they’re not reading ’til the end, but we write it like they are,
right? . . . And traffic could unlock those answers.
Why did The Times restrict reporters’ access to metrics? Two answers
emerged in the course of my research. First, there was a concern that seeing
metrics could lead reporters astray from their independent news judgment. In-
stead of covering topics that are important or newsworthy, they would start to
focus on more frivolous subjects that are guaranteed to be popular. Said one
reporter:
It would be a bad idea for us to be choosing stories based on how many peo-
ple were reading them . . . I mean, if you go down that road, then you end up
writing a lot about, you know, Angelina Jolie or whatever.
While interviewees often invoked this fear, it was usually voiced abstractly,
as a hypothetical, worst-case scenario. The Times’s history, single-family ma-
jority ownership, and longstanding organizational culture made the adoption
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of purely metrics-driven decision-making seem highly unlikely to many staffers.
“There’s no danger of that at The Times,” said one reporter, articulating a sen-
timent I commonly heard in interviews, “because the entire philosophy of the
place and . . . woven deep, deep, deep into the fabric of the place is opposed to
that.”
The second—and in my view, more important—reason The Times restricted
reporters’ access to metrics was because of concerns that they would misin-
terpret the data. We tend to assume that the meaning of metrics is relatively
straightforward: Story A got more page views than Story B; Story B got the
most Facebook shares of the week, and so on. But several Times staffers com-
mented that they found metrics quite difficult to make sense of, let alone act
upon. This is not because most journalists are “bad at math,” as the late
Times media columnist David Carr put it,25 but rather because journalists at
a place like The Times are trying to optimize for multiple and sometimes con-
flicting aims. They want to attract large audiences and grow their subscriber
base, but they also want to bring about outcomes that are far more difficult
to measure and quantify, such as having impact and causing change.xiii Add
to this the fact that each story is arguably a qualitatively different entity, and
interpretation of metrics becomes even more fraught. The result is that metrics
at The Times are nowhere near as straightforward as, say, baseball statistics,
which are collected and interpreted in the service of maximizing one end—
winning as many games as possible. As a Times reporter put it:
If one story gets 425,000 hits and another one gets 372,000, is that meaningful,
that difference? Where does it become important and where doesn’t it?
An editor echoed this theme of interpretive ambiguity:
When you’re looking at a raw number, it’s hard to know how that fits into
what you would expect . . . It’s almost like, you rarely have an apples to apples
comparison. . . . There’s so many other things kind of confounding it.
The fact that audience metrics could be interpreted in multiple ways, de-
pending on who was doing the interpreting, was a source of concern for editors.
Some worried reporters would use metrics to challenge their decisions. For in-
stance, when asked why The Times newsroom restricted access to analytics,
one editor described his annoyance at what he saw as reporters’ misreading of
xiii. While they are beyond the scope of this report, it should be noted that there are several
efforts currently underway to systematically measure forms of journalistic impact other than
with traffic: most notably the Media Impact Project at the University of Southern California,
ProPublica’s Tracking Reports, and the Tow Center’s Newslynx project.
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the most-emailed list (which, by virtue of its place on The Times home page, is
one of the only metrics to which reporters had regular access):
People in here will say, “oh my gosh, look, my story’s number one on the most-
emailed list, you should put it on the home page!” Well, no, we’re not making
judgments based on that. We’re making judgments based on . . . what are the
most interesting, or the most important stories for our readers.
To this editor, the fact that reporters drew incorrect conclusions from the
most-emailed list meant that they should not have access to more data. A
Chartbeat employee had encountered a similar line of thinking among clients.
While creating an earlier version of the company’s dashboard, she had worked
with a number of legacy news organizations that didn’t provide universal access
to metrics; they gave it instead only to high-level editors for whom there was:
no fear about them misusing data, abusing data. And “abusing” means that
they don’t know how to read it, therefore don’t understand it, therefore are
. . . gonna make the wrong, like incorrect assumptions, or use it to their advan-
tage.
There was also a concern among editors that metrics could demoralize re-
porters by disabusing them of common (though incorrect) print-era assump-
tions about their audience. A member of the internal team that spent six
months studying the newsroom to produce The Times’s Innovation Report
said the group had come across this fear:
Reporters . . . in the print universe, they’ve had circulation numbers. And you
push them on this and they know it’s not true, but they all believe that the
circulation number is sort of how many people read their story . . . They kind
of really do have this inflated sense of readership. So there’s a real worry that
delivering them hard data on digital readers will be demotivating.
In sum, metrics are a source of anxiety at The Times, not only because
of their power to influence content, but also because of their potential im-
pact on the organization’s internal dynamics. Metrics provided an alternative
yardstick—aside from editors’ evaluations—by which reporters could judge the
worthiness of their stories and their job performances more broadly. The data
therefore threatened to undermine not only news judgment, but also the tradi-
tional hierarchical structure of The Times newsroom, in which editors were the
final arbiters of the nebulous quality that is “newsworthiness.” If editors alone
had access to metrics, they alone could control the way in which the data was
interpreted and mobilized.
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It is a common conception that data analytics will displace established “ex-
perts” who base decisions on their own experience, intuition, and judgment.
Economist and Yale Law professor Ian Ayres concisely articulates this view:
“We are in a historic moment of horse-versus-locomotive competition, where
intuitive and experiential expertise is losing out time and time again to number
crunching.”26 Indeed, the story goes, this is what happened to baseball scouts
in Moneyball; it’s what happened to political pundits during the 2012 election
with the rise of Nate Silver.
It is not hard to see how a version of this narrative might apply to journal-
ism. Editors could (and, at many organizations, do) find themselves increas-
ingly displaced by metrics that demonstrate what content is winning large
audiences and, in some cases, make suggestions about placement and story
assignment. An online editor at The Times succinctly voiced this anxiety:
Really the only thing an editor has—like their full job is based on their judg-
ment, ’cause that’s really what they do, is they just sit and use their judgment
to edit stories and decide how important they are and where they should go on
the site. And so, replacing that with metrics is some sort of massive threat to
their livelihood and value in the job.
Thus, Times editors restricted access to metrics in order to minimize the
perceived danger presented by the data. At the same time, it was clear to
editors that metrics could be quite useful as a management tool, and many
reported employing it in this way.
The Invocation and Disclosure of Selective Metrics
as a Management Tool
The fact that reporters did not have regular access to analytics is not to say
they were never exposed to this data. Obviously, reporters could always see
the limited metrics that are made public on The Times site, such as most-
emailed and most-viewed. While editors sometimes expressed annoyance or
bewilderment at reporters’ interest in the most-emailed list, they also regularly
congratulated reporters whose stories made the list. As one reporter explained:
It’s absolutely routine now that when any desk head sends out their “what a
great job we’re doing” [email], it will go, “it was a great week, [so-and-so’s]
story shot to number one most-emailed in three-and-a-half hours.”
Again, this suggests that it was not the most-emailed list per se that editors
objected to—rather, it was the fact that reporters sometimes interpreted the
list in ways that editors did not approve of or agree with.
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In addition to invoking the most-emailed list, editors often shared carefully
curated proprietary metrics with reporters, often to accomplish particular
management goals. One such goal was to increase reporters’ enthusiasm for
writing content that would appear only on The Times website, not in the print
publication. Researchers studying The Times, such as Nikki Usher and the
internal team that produced the Innovation Report on the organization’s digital
challenges, have found that The Times continues to locate most of its prestige
in the print edition. My own findings strongly corroborated this. As an editor
explained:
We have this tradition at The Times that when somebody gets a story on page
one for the first time, we order a modern-day version of what used to be like
the page one plaque during the days of lead type and, you know, it’s like this
aluminum sheet with the page one etchings on it, which is sort of our honorary
acknowledgement that they got a story on page one . . . Nobody wants to get a
plaque that shows their story on the home page of The Times.
As noted above, this favoring of the print edition over the online one had
material implications for reporters. An online-oriented editor recounted em-
ployee evaluations from her time as a reporter:
In my annual review, even though I was an exclusively digital person who was
supposed to be pioneering things, there was no mention made of anything
[other] than the number of stories I had on page one. That is still the metric
that is used for reporters. Over and above everything else.
Given the higher status of the print edition relative to the online one, it was
unsurprising that some reporters were not particularly eager to write online-
only content, such as blog posts. This could be problematic for editors, who
needed to fill The Times’s sprawling website with content, much of which
would never run in the print paper. Metrics came in handy as a way to in-
crease reporters’ enthusiasm for writing online-only content, and editors often
used them to do just that. In the words of an editor (the same one who was
annoyed when reporters advocated for home page placement based on their
story’s appearance on the most-emailed list):
One of the things that we’ve tried to do with [audience data] is to use it for
other purposes. At The Times being on A1 is a hugely important thing and
a huge accomplishment. We’re trying to impress upon people the value of be-
ing on the home page, too. And so if you can say, “hey, thought you’d wanna
know—your story was being read by 8,000 people at nine o’ clock this morning
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. . . ” or something like that, then the point of that is just to try to emphasize to
people the value of being on the home page.xiv
An anecdote recounted to me further emphasized this theme: An editor
had called one of The Times in-house analysts and asked him to pull some
historical traffic data for the Bats blog, the paper’s erstwhile baseball blog.
When asked why he needed these particular numbers, the editor explained
that he was assigning three reporters to cover the World Series game that
night. Two were going to write stories for the print paper, and one was going
to write for Bats. The reporter delegated to the blog was unhappy about his
assignment, so the editor wanted to share some metrics with him to show that
his audience when writing for Bats would in fact be bigger than if he were
writing for the paper. Thus, unlike the baseball scouts in Moneyball, who found
themselves made irrelevant by Billy Beane’s data-driven approach to selecting
players, Times editors rendered metrics subordinate to their judgment more
often than the other way around. As one editor put it: “If I need to prove a
point, I go there.”
At the time of this writing, The Times is taking steps to broaden access to
editorial metrics and diminish the organization’s focus on the front page and
print edition. Even as circumstances at The Times continue to change, the
organization’s longtime status quo with regard to metrics illustrates that data
can be mobilized to serve managerial ends in ways that look very different from
the Gawker model.
The Black Market for Data
Not all reporters were content to depend on editors for exposure to metrics.
Some described participating in a kind of black market for analytics, in which
they found ways to sidestep the newsroom’s policies and access data on their
stories. Social connections to newsroom staffers who had regular access to
analytics could be useful in this regard. As a reporter explained:
I don’t have a [Chartbeat] account, but I do like to look over the shoulder of
the [web producer] that sits in front of me who does, and he and I have great
conversations about what the traffic means and what the traffic patterns are
xiv. The Times continues to use metrics in this way as the newsroom tries to expand
staffers’ online focus beyond just the home page. For instance, the Innovation Report team
collected data from the organization’s business side about how many people receive Times
news alerts with hopes that sharing the large number would persuade more reporters to file
them.
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and where our traffic’s coming from, you know, all that sort of [thing]. ’Cause
he’s a web producer, so he has access to it and sees it.
Some reporters also made use of freely available tools, such as bit.ly and
Topsy, to monitor the social media response to their stories. In addition, I
spoke to a small number of reporters who had retained access to analytics from
when they inhabited other roles within the organization. According to one such
reporter:
The only reason I have access to the metrics is because I still have tools that I
used when I worked in [a tech department], and so I can go in and see kind of
what’s going on . . . But most reporters wouldn’t know their story got 20 page
views or 20 million.
Indeed, when making the case to executive editor Dean Baquet for wider ac-
cess to metrics in the newsroom, the Innovation Report team argued that many
reporters were finding their own ways to access metrics; without comprehensive
data and training to help them make sense of it, they said, there was a greater
chance of troubling misinterpretations.
The Subculture of Online-only Sections
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their lack of prestige relative to the print edi-
tion, online-only sections and roles had quite a different orientation to metrics.
While editors and reporters alike bristled at the notion of assigning traditional
news stories based solely on traffic predictions, traffic was a major consider-
ation when deciding which interactive features and blogs to create, cut, or
expand. A reporter recalled the rationale for the construction of an elaborate
interactive feature:
After studying the idea for a while, they calculated maybe it would be worth
doing, ’cause even though it would take a certain number of person-hours to
build, it will get enough traffic to justify it. And so that’s the type of decision
that [the interactive] group would make, because . . . the deep, sophisticated
things they’re only gonna build if they think they’re gonna get a lot of traffic.
For the print staff, the higher one’s status in the organization, the greater
one’s access to metrics. This correlation did not apply to online-only teams
and roles. Though web producers are usually junior relative to the rest of the
editorial staff, for example, they had unfettered access to traffic data. So did
staffers who built interactive features. An editor explained:
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The people working on the projects have the most direct access to data . . . and
[the interactive team editors] get those numbers from them. And actually even
across Google Analytics and other things, it’s usually the folks closest to the
project that are looking at that data and kind of bubbling up the things from
it.
At first glance, the circumscribed role of analytics at The Times seems to
indicate that the organization does not find audience data important or rele-
vant to its work. But these findings demonstrate that The Times’s restrictive
policies around metrics do not primarily stem from a dismissive attitude toward
analytics. Rather, the phenomena described here—the newsroom’s system of
tiered access to metrics, editors’ selective disclosure of data, and reporters’ ef-
forts to obtain metrics via alternative methods—are acknowledgments of the
seductive power of metrics, and illustrations of the newsroom’s ambivalent and
apprehensive relationship to that power.

Conclusion
A Moment of Convergence on Metrics?
On May 15, 2014, BuzzFeed published a leaked version of what has become
known as The New York Times’s Innovation Report. The document spanned
nearly 100 pages and was the product of six months of reporting and research
by a team of Times staffers tasked with assessing the paper’s transition to
the digital age and crafting recommendations for moving forward. The re-
port painted a picture of an organization struggling mightily to reconcile its
storied print past (and present) with its digital future. Many of its findings
overlapped with those of this research, such as the online edition’s persistent
prestige deficit relative to that of the print edition, and the organization’s diffi-
culties melding the online and print editions into a cohesive entity.
Metrics are an important patch of terrain where these struggles are playing
out. The report urged greater use of analytics in editorial decision-making,
though did not devote much space to the issue. This is because, in advance of
the report’s internal release, the research team had already successfully made
the case for more metrics-driven decision-making in an extensive presentation
to executive editor Dean Baquet. Since then, the organization has made sig-
nificant investments in growing The Times’s audience. During the fall of 2014,
Alexandra MacCallum was appointed assistant managing editor for outreach.
MacCallum formed a 23-person audience development team (consisting mostly
of existing staffers, along with some new hires), which, significantly, set up
shop in the newsroom.27 There are also nascent efforts, spearheaded by the
newly appointed internal “strategy team,” to broaden access to metrics among
a wider swath of editorial staffers, including some reporters.
In addition, executive editor Dean Baquet is working to diminish the news-
room’s focus on the front page. In February of 2015, Baquet sent a memo to
newsroom staff explaining that instead of jockeying for page one placement,
desks would instead compete to make “Dean’s list,” a group of enterprise sto-
ries selected by masthead editors that would receive “the very best play on
all our digital platforms.”28 This shift indicates that the paper’s allocation of
prestige will soon start to follow, though the process is likely to be gradual.
Meanwhile, Gawker Media underwent a series of major changes at the end
of 2014. On December 2, Denton announced the ouster of Joel Johnson as ed-
itorial director, writing that if Gawker hoped to beat well-funded competitors
BuzzFeed and Vox in 2015, “our talent selection and development, and our ed-
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itorial plays, must be as shrewd and accomplished as the baseball management
popularized by Moneyball.” This reference seemed to suggest Gawker would
move in an even more metrics-driven direction. But in a subsequent post, Den-
ton cited Gawker’s traffic-chasing as one of the reasons he felt the quality of
the company’s content had suffered in 2014: “Editorial traffic was lifted but
often by viral stories that we would rather mock. We—the freest journalists on
the planet—were slaves to the Facebook algorithm.” Just over a month later,
Denton published another blog post, this one announcing that the traffic chart
displaying unique visitors to Gawker sites over time that had long adorned the
wall of Gawker’s editorial floor would be taken down. Instead, the screen would
show a blog of the best stories across the Gawker network, as chosen by newly
appointed executive editor Tommy Craggs and his Politburo, a small group
of senior editorial staffers. The Politburo would also determine sites’ bonuses
based on its evaluation of their content. “A layer of subjective editorial judg-
ment will return,” Denton wrote. “Newspaper traditionalists will no doubt see
this as vindication.”
Denton’s post should be taken with a grain (if not a hunk) of salt; in the
past he has indicated a desire to diminish the company’s focus on traffic with-
out meaningfully changing company incentive structures or HR policies.xv
These changes seem more substantial than those the company has adopted
in the past, but Gawker is known for its willingness to experiment; the new
approach may turn out to be short-lived, especially if traffic (and advertising
revenue) takes a major hit. It is also likely that years of working with metrics-
based incentives have conditioned Gawker writers to pursue the kinds of stories
that will draw uniques; indeed, Craggs told me this was one of the reasons he
was not worried about traffic plummeting as a result of the new policies. Nor
has the company completely turned away from traffic: The Big Board still
adorns the wall on Gawker’s editorial floor; counts of uniques and page views
still appear on posts; and the widely loathed Kinja leaderboard—while no
longer displayed in the office—is still publicly available online, as are the traffic
numbers for individual Gawker writers. The company also still collects eCPM
numbers for writers, though Craggs said he “get[s] hives when people start talk-
xv. In 2012, Denton wrote a post explaining that employee evaluations now looked not only
at an “individual’s audience appeal but at their reputation among colleagues and contribution
to the site’s reputation” because “relentless and cynical traffic-trawling is bad for the soul.”
Yet the company’s continued focus on individual eCPM numbers in personnel decisions, as
well as the installation of the individual leaderboard just before the start of my research, indi-
cates that Denton’s statement did not amount to much. (F. Kamer, “Nick Denton’s ‘State of
Gawker 2012’ Memo: ‘Relentless and cynical traffic-trawling is bad for the soul,’” New York
Observer, 5 Jan. 2012, http://observer.com/2012/01/leaked-gawker-memo-01052011/ )
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ing about that stuff here.” Whatever future direction Gawker takes, the fact
that Denton invoked Moneyball—arguably the best known parable about the
superiority of quantitative performance data to the judgment of entrenched
experts—shortly before announcing the replacement of a traffic chart with a
“handcrafted blog” that would vindicate “newspaper traditionalists” is telling—
both about company’s internal contradictions and challenges it will face moving
forward.
These recent developments suggest that Gawker and The Times, once po-
lar opposites in their orientations toward metrics, are moving closer to one
another. This is not all that surprising, given that both organizations are
trying to work through basically the same dilemma with regard to metrics.
Journalists—even nontraditional, analytics-savvy ones—are hesitant to fully
equate an article’s audience size with its quality and importance. Yet given
that journalism is, by definition, a public-facing profession, indifference to audi-
ence interests and behaviors likewise seems inappropriate. It is also, practically
speaking, impossible: at a time when home page visits are falling and readers
increasingly get their news via social media, no commercial media organization
is exempt from playing the traffic game.
What are we to make of this tension? It is not one that can be resolved
simply by the creation of better metrics.xvi While online metrics are relatively
new, they raise fundamental questions about journalism that are anything
but. What is, ultimately, the purpose of journalism? What should it try to
accomplish? And perhaps most importantly: what does it mean to have a
media system that is simultaneously a primarily commercial, for-profit industry
and one of our most vital democratic institutions? For much of the twentieth
century, the high profit margins enjoyed by major media companies provided
something of a reprieve from thinking deeply about these questions. Nowadays,
xvi. This is not to say that all analytics are created equal, nor to suggest that efforts to
make better metrics are for naught. An organization that emphasizes so-called “engagement
metrics,” such as a user’s time spent on a site, number of visits, and number of consecutive
pages visited, is likely to have a much better user experience than one that focuses primarily
on page views. However, it is dangerous to assume that a metric like time spent necessarily
incentivizes the production of more important or serious content. Chartbeat recently found
that stories about a cocktail dress that appeared to be a different color depending on the
viewer garnered more clicks and more attention than stories about a federal court’s net neu-
trality ruling. While the difference in attention between the two stories was smaller than
the discrepancy in clicks, it was still substantial: stories about the dress gained 2.5 times
the amount of attention as stories about the net neutrality ruling. (A.C. Fitts, “Can Tony
Haile Save Journalism by Changing the Metric?” Columbia Journalism Review, 11 Mar. 2015,
http://www.cjr.org/innovations/tony_haile_chartbeat.php )
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the economic reality of the contemporary media field (of which metrics are a
particularly vivid manifestation) forces us to confront them head on.
The intention of this report is to play a role in this process, by stepping
away from dire (or bullish) predictions about the impact of metrics on journal-
ism to consider how this data is actually produced, interpreted, and used by
individuals and organizations. Below are some of the central findings, followed
by suggested directions for future research in this line of inquiry.
Key Findings
• Analytics dashboards communicate powerful social and emotional
messages. Conversations about metrics, as well as analytics companies’ own
marketing materials, tend to focus on the ways in which metrics are a ratio-
nalizing force in newsrooms, allowing journalists to access the unvarnished
truth about their audience’s behavior and make decisions accordingly. But
this view overlooks the ways in which analytics dashboards are designed to
do more than simply communicate data. For instance, Chartbeat’s dash-
board is designed to convey deference to journalistic judgment and provide
opportunities for positivity and celebration. Chartbeat employees also down-
play disappointing metrics in their conversations with clients. These actions
help to engender positive feelings in clients about Chartbeat’s product.
• Chartbeat faces a similar dilemma to one of its news organization
clients: its most popular metrics are not always the ones it’s most
proud of. Chartbeat has invested considerable time and effort into build-
ing metrics that attempt to quantify audience loyalty and engagement—
both because the company believes that engagement metrics will incentivize
higher-quality content and because these metrics serve an important prestige
function. Still, staffers acknowledged that for many clients, the dashboard’s
most popular feature is its real-time, speedometer-style dial of concurrent
users. Thus, the dashboard’s success is partly due to its combination of pres-
tige metrics—which allow Chartbeat to claim allegiance to journalistic values
and position itself against rival analytics companies—and highly addictive
metrics from which journalists struggle to tear their eyes away.
• Organizational culture heavily shapes the use of metrics. Efforts to
examine the ways in which metrics are changing journalism should keep in
mind that the reverse can also be true. While Gawker’s norms and practices
are very much influenced by the company’s historical emphasis on metrics,
The Times’s longstanding organizational culture and structure significantly
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shapes the role of metrics in the newsroom. For instance, instead of finding
their authority diminished by metrics, Times editors controlled the circula-
tion and interpretation of metrics in the newsroom such that they used data
to serve preexisting editorial and managerial ends.
• Journalism’s multiple goals can make metrics difficult to interpret.
Most news organizations—even Gawker Media—are not solely aiming to
amass as much traffic as possible. This can lead to confusion about how to
read analytics data. There is a general sense that, for instance, a story on
drone strikes should not be held to the same traffic expectations as one on
Game of Thrones. The two stories are qualitatively different—but metrics,
by definition, rank pieces of content according to uniform standards. When
interpreting metrics, some journalists therefore found it difficult to determine
what constituted a fair comparison or an appropriate standard for a given
article.
• Metrics can be a source of intense stress for writers and editors,
but also one of validation and solace. The relentlessness of metrics, the
competitiveness of rankings, and the somewhat unpredictable nature of web
traffic caused considerable anxiety among writers and editors at Gawker.
However, many staffers reported far more stress about commenters and
online trolls than they did about metrics. Indeed, at times, high traffic num-
bers served as reassurance for staffers that negative comments, vitriolic as
they were, represented only a tiny minority of a vast audience. In this way,
some staffers used metrics to psychologically buffer against an onslaught of
negative feedback.
• Traffic pressures can coexist with a strong perception of editorial
autonomy. This was the case at Gawker, where writers and editors felt free
to do “what they wanted,” even as they also knew they would be evaluated
based on metrics.
• Metrics fuel internal competition. Because analytics tools rank indi-
vidual stories and authors, they can have the effect of turning competition
further inward. Rather than focusing on surpassing blogs owned by rival
media companies (whose traffic numbers they usually did not have access
to), editorial staffers at Gawker often expressed a desire to beat the traffic of
their sister sites.
• A metrics-driven culture can be just as sticky as a legacy one.
Gawker’s longtime emphasis on metrics—and especially metrics-based pay
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incentives—made it difficult for the company to shift its focus to interac-
tion, which was not as easily quantified. This raises questions about the
widespread tendency to conceptualize editorial judgment and metrics as two
entirely distinct—and often incompatible—entities. At a place like Gawker,
where a post’s quality and the size of its audience were often considered to
be at least somewhat correlative, staffers’ editorial judgment was inextrica-
bly linked to their notions (based on past metrics) about what would hit a
nerve with audiences. The management’s directive to shift partially away
from that model was thus interpreted as a threat, not only to traffic but also
to editorial staffers’ judgment and professional autonomy.
Questions for Future Research
• What do news consumers make of metrics? Existing studies about
news metrics, including this one, usually focus on how analytics data affects
professional journalists. It would be valuable to have more knowledge about
news consumers’ relationship to metrics. Are audiences aware that their
behavior on news sites is being tracked to the extent that it is? If so, does
this awareness shape reading habits? There is an unfortunate tendency in
journalistic and academic circles to conflate readers’ behavior (e.g., a story
about Kim Kardashian got more clicks than any other story) with their true
desire (e.g., this means readers want more stories about Kim Kardashian
than any other topic, even if they might say otherwise).xvii Do readers share
the belief that their clicks equal their interest level, or do they see a more
complex relationship between their behavior and desire?
• Are metrics actually shaping content, and if so, how? There is
widespread speculation that exposure to metrics leads news organizations
to prioritize fluffy stories that will be sure-fire traffic hits over meaty, chal-
lenging ones that are unlikely to draw a large audience. Yet, a couple no-
xvii. As C.W. Anderson puts it, “in our rush to capture audience data, we run the risk of
oversimplifying the notion of informational desire.” (C.W. Anderson, “‘Squeezing Humanity
Through a Straw’: The Long-term Consequences of Using Metrics in Journalism,” 14 Sep.
2010, http : / / www . niemanlab . org / 2010 / 09 / squeezing - humanity - through - a - straw - the -
long - term - consequences - of - using - metrics - in - journalism/ ) For example, the headline on
a piece from The Atlantic’s Derek Thompson about this reads, “Why Audiences Hate Hard
News—and Love Pretending Otherwise.” Addressing readers, Thompson continues: “If we
merely asked what you wanted, without measuring what you wanted, you’d just keep lying to
us—and to yourself.” (D. Thompson, “Why Audiences Hate Hard News—and Love Pretend-
ing Otherwise,” The Atlantic, 17 Jun. 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2014/06/news-kim-kardashian-kanye-west-benghazi/372906/ )
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table exceptions notwithstanding,xviii there has been little empirical research
investigating whether or not this is actually true. For instance, do general
interest publications contain more pop culture coverage and less political
coverage than they used to? If so, can this plausibly be attributed to the
spread of metrics? These questions pose methodological challenges for re-
searchers, but investigating them would enhance our understanding of the
effect of metrics on the contemporary media industry.
• What is the impact of impact metrics? Future research would do well
to examine efforts to create metrics that measure a news story’s impact,
judged on factors such as whether a story prompted congressional hearings,
lawsuits, or policy changes.xix What sorts of ideas about journalism are
embedded in new measures of impact? How do impact metrics interact
with traffic metrics within news organizations that are trying to make use
of both? What are the implications—both for the press as a democratic
institution and for reporters’ working conditions—of judgments based on
impact versus judgments based on traffic?
Recommendations for Newsrooms
• Prioritize big-picture, strategic thinking about metrics. Most of
the journalists with whom I spoke were too busy with their daily assign-
ments to think extensively or abstractly about the role of metrics in their
organization, or which metrics best complemented their journalistic goals.
Newsrooms should create opportunities for reflective, deliberate thinking
about analytics that is removed from daily production pressures. The Times
has recently taken an important step in this direction with the creation of
a full-time “strategy team,” whose mission, in the words of Arthur Gregg
Sulzberger, is “to focus on working with the masthead to identify, develop
and prioritize digital initiatives, implementing some of the recommenda-
tions in the Innovation Report, and collaborating with colleagues throughout
the building to ensure we’re keeping pace with the fast-changing needs and
habits of our readers.”29 One of the team’s first initiatives is to figure out
xviii. For example, see A. Lee, S.C. Lewis, and M. Powers, “Audience
Clicks and News Placement: A Study of Time-Lagged Influence in On-
line Journalism,” Communication Research XX(X) (2012), 126, accessed at
http://crx.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/11/19/0093650212467031.abstract.
xix. Examples include the Media Impact Project at the University of Southern California,
the Newslynx project at Columbia University’s Tow Center for Digital Journalism, and ProP-
ublica’s Tracking Reports.
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how best to broaden access to analytics in the newsroom by engaging in
extensive discussions with the news desks and the audience development
team. While it is too soon to see what impact the strategy team will have,
its existence is a promising development. Still, most news organizations will
not be able to spare the resources for a dedicated staffer (let alone several)
to do this sort of internal research and deliberate strategic thinking. This is
an area where collaborative relationships between newsrooms and journal-
ism scholars may be fruitful: newsrooms can grant access to researchers in
exchange for an outside analytical perspective (informed by candid conversa-
tions with anonymous staffers) on the operations of the organization.
• When choosing an analytics service, look beyond the tools. We
have a tendency to see numbers as authoritative and dispassionate reflections
of the empirical world. For that reason, while it is intuitively obvious that
analytics companies have their own business imperatives, it can be easy to
forget this when looking at a dashboard packed with numerical data. This
is not to say that companies like Chartbeat do not provide an accurate and
useful service. Rather, it is to suggest that when newsroom managers are
selecting from an array of analytics services, they should consider not only
the tools available, but also which company’s values and strategic objectives
best align with their own.
• Identify the limitations of metrics. What, if anything, simply
can’t be counted? As one follows debates on metrics and news over
time, a pattern starts to become visible. One metric rises to prominence and
widespread use only to face a backlash; critics argue that it incentivizes bad
journalistic behavior and content of poor quality. Unless they are against
the use of metrics altogether (which it seems that fewer and fewer are), these
critics often advocate for the use of an alternative metric, which is said to
reward good journalistic traits and more serious, civically minded content.
The first metric is displaced (in reputation, if not in actual usage)xx by the
second one—until it, too, is knocked off the pedestal. It is in this way that
unique visitors replaced page views as the favored metric, only to be now
challenged by engagement metrics.
To say that the cycle has become familiar is not to imply that no progress
xx. For, as Brian Abelson has pointed out, even widely lamented metrics tend to have con-
siderable staying power; once organizational systems are built around a particular measure,
it can be quite hard to change them. (B. Abelson, “Whither the Page View Apocalypse?”
Abelson.nyc, 10 Oct. 2013, http : / / abelson . nyc / open - news / 2013 / 10 / 09 / Whither - the -
%20pageview_apocalypse.html )
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has been made, or that all metrics are equally useful—far from it. Efforts to
improve audience analytics and to measure the impact of news are important
and worthwhile. But newsrooms, analytics companies, funders, and media
researchers should consider which of journalism’s most compelling and in-
dispensable traits may stubbornly resist the process of commensuration that
metrics impose on news. This leads to an even more difficult question: Does
a highly commercial media system such as ours allow us to assign adequate
value to that which is uncountable? This is the issue that the spread of news
metrics will eventually force us to seriously contemplate.

Glossary
This is a list of terms related to audience metrics. The decision to include and
exclude specific terms was necessarily subjective. For this glossary we have
included those used in this metrics report, common vernacular, designations
used by significant analytics companies, and oft-employed terminology relating
to large social platforms—the meanings of which may not be obvious to all
readers.
Term/Definition
Active visits - this refers to Chartbeat’s presentation of three main met-
rics, prominently displayed at the top of its dashboard, which provide data
about users who are presently engaging on a site. These metrics are concur-
rents, engaged time, and recirculation.
Ad drop-off - the percentage of visitors who leave a video during the ad
pre-roll.
App performance metrics - metrics used to analyze the technical per-
formance of an app, such as user timing (a term Google employs to mean how
long it takes for a user to perform a given user action).
Attention minutes - a metric Upworthy defines as the amount of time a
user is engaged with a video, estimated by tracking video player signals about
whether a video is playing, user’s mouse movements, and which browser tab is
currently open to infer whether a user is actually watching the video.
Authentication/authenticated user - authentication, by way of user
registration and a log-in process, for example, helps to filter out robots and
spiders to give a more accurate count of unique visitors, thereby helping to
identify and value users.
Average engagement - the average length of time that all users spend
engaged on a particular page. See Engaged time.
Behavior Flow - a Google Analytics report that visualizes the path a user
takes from one page to the next. A publisher defines “nodes” on a site map,
which could be a single page, a collection of pages, or an event (such as a video
play or download), and can then view the volume of traffic among nodes.
Big Board - Chartbeat tool for newsrooms that displays a constantly re-
freshing list of a top-performing articles.
Bounce - a visit/session that consists of a single view of one page by a user
who then immediately leaves the site. The Web Analytics Association (WAA)
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also calls this a “single page view visit,” not to be confused with a “single page
visit,” which can consist of multiple views of the same page.
Bounce rate - the percentage of users who view one page and then leave
the site.
Break the Internet - a hyperbolic expression (stronger than “go viral”) for
an unusually sharp rise in page views, shares, and other engagement around a
particular piece of content.
Click - a colloquial term referring to a page view.
Click-through rate - the number of times a link is clicked, divided by the
number of times it is viewed.
Click-through/clickthrough - the number of times a link is clicked.
Clickbait/click bait - a term with numerous definitions, including a head-
line that overpromises relative to what it delivers, sensationalist or otherwise
low-quality content, or a teasing headline (so-called “curiosity-gap headline”)
intended to grab viewers’ attention and generate more page views.
Clicks per minute - the number of times per minute visitors click on any
link to a particular article. Chartbeat assigns a color code (green, yellow, red)
to articles based on their clicks-per-minute performance compared to historical
data for articles in the same page position with similar timing (time of day, day
of the week).
Close rate - YouTube uses this to express the percentage of annotations
immediately closed by the user. On YouTube, an annotation is a clickable text
overlay on a video. Annotations commonly ask viewers to like, favorite, or
share a video, or to link to related content.
Collective traffic - an inexact term generally referring to the number of
visitors and the number of pages visited for a specific website. See also Site
traffic.
Concurrents - the number of unique visitors currently viewing a site.
Chartbeat provides second-to-second counts of its clients’ concurrents.
Concurrents dial - a meter-like visualization that displays how many peo-
ple are on a site on a second-by-second basis, with a maximum cap as defined
by the publisher. When the number of concurrents exceeds this cap, the pub-
lisher sees a broken dial.
Conversation rate - this is a term concerning social media, describing the
proportion of an audience moved to discuss certain content. On Facebook, for
example, it refers specifically to the ratio of “talking about this” to “reach” —
with “talking about this” as derived from a number of potential participatory
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signals, which include comments, likes, shares, RSVPs, and other actions. See
also Reach and Talking about this.
Conversion - the completion of some action by a user as intended by the
site designer, such as clicking on a link or buying a subscription. A visit that
results in a conversion is sometimes called a “converter.”
Cookie - also called an HTTP cookie, web cookie, or browser cookie. This
is a piece of data placed in the user’s browser memory when he/she visits a
site. There are various uses of cookies; for metrics purposes, cookies can track a
visitor’s actions through a particular session (session cookies), or track behavior
over multiple sessions as long as the user’s browser is not reset.
Cross-posting - posting the same content to multiple platforms.
Daily Content Perspective - Chartbeat’s daily (midnight to midnight)
summary of site metrics, which features the highest performing articles, top
sections, top authors, and a summary of overall traffic.
Dark social - a term coined by Alexis Madrigal of The Atlantic referring to
social sharing for which analytics software cannot ascertain a referrer. See also
Unknown referrer traffic.
Dashboard/analytics dashboard - a display of metrics provided by ana-
lytics products. Dashboards generally include visualizations of up-to-the-minute
data and options to view the data by different segments.
Device segmentation - a categorization of visitors by device (desktop,
mobile, or tablet).
Digital fold - the point on a digital page beyond which a user must scroll
to see more content. This term has become less meaningful as the growth of
screen sizes, new devices, and software configurations have vastly increased the
potential range of browser dimensions.
Direct traffic - a label used by Google Analytics and Chartbeat to refer
to sessions from people who typed in a URL, clicked on a bookmark, or copied
and pasted a URL into a browser. The more technical name for direct traffic
is “unknown referrer traffic,” because the browser request does not include a
referrer variable. See also Unknown referrer traffic.
Engaged time - Chartbeat’s term for the amount of time users spend
reading, watching, commenting, or otherwise engaging with content. Chart-
beat measures engaged time by tracking keyboard and mouse events, inferring
whether a tab is active or not.
Engaged users - Facebook uses this term for the number of unique people
(in reality, unique Facebook profiles) who have clicked on a given post.
Engagement score - a ranking metric based on a combination of popular-
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ity and average engagement with a video, benchmarked against the publisher’s
entire video library.
Entry page/landing page - rather ambiguous terms that Google Analyt-
ics and other media analytics companies use interchangeably to mean the first
page a user visits when he/she comes to a site. Landing page can also refer to a
page that the publisher specifically intends to be the user’s point of entry into a
session.
Event - any logged or recorded action that has a date and time assigned
to it by either the browser or server. Examples include a click, a mouseover, a
video play, a key press, and many others. Events can be counted in different
ways: by the total number of occurrences of an event, the number of visits
that include at least one occurrence of an event, or the number of visitors who
execute the event at least once.
Exit page - the last page visited before a user leaves the site.
First launch/new user - this refers to the session when an app is opened
for the first time on a device.
Impact metrics - a high-level term regarding attempts to measure the
impact that journalistic works have on the world. These have emerged partially
as a response to the perceived inability of browser-based metrics to describe
journalism’s social utility.
Inbound link - also known as a backlink, incoming link, inlink, and inward
link, this term refers to any link into a site from outside sites. Publishers are
notified by a kind of acknowledgment called a “trackback” when other sites link
to theirs.
Individual traffic/personal traffic - traffic to all posts on a given site
that are authored by a single person.
Influencer/social influencer - a person or entity with a significant follow-
ing on social media.
Install - the event of installing an application onto a device. Frequently
used in reference to smartphones and tablets.
Internal traffic - traffic coming from a link within the same site.
Kinja Leaderboard - list of Kinja users with the highest number of unique
page views in the past 30 days. Kinja is Gawker Media’s publishing platform.
Like - a recorded action of “liking” (as in, giving a virtual “thumbs up”) a
post, usually referring to Facebook. Instagram and LinkedIn also use this term.
YouTube has both “like” and “dislike” options, and BuzzFeed has an array of
tags that users can choose from (<3, WIN, OMG, LOL, FAIL, CUTE, broken
heart emoticon, YAAASS, WTF, TRASHY, and EW).
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Location - user location, sometimes based on an IP address or readings
from device sensors.
Map overlay - a geographical visualization of a given metric.
New visitor - a user visiting the site for the first time during a given re-
porting period.
Page exit ratio - the number of exits from a page, divided by the total
views of that page. Unlike bounce rate, page exit ratio applies to visits/sessions
of all lengths.
Page view/pageview - any time a user views a page by any method, such
as clicking on a link, typing in a URL, or refreshing a page. Page views are
sometimes called “hits” or “clicks.”
Platform segmentation - a categorization of visitors accessing a website
versus those using its mobile app.
Play rate - the percentage of visitors who click play on a video.
Play Store view - a page view of the app description page within the
Google Play Store.
Post-click metrics - this generally refers to any metric describing the
session after a session is initiated, either positively (time on a site or other
engagement metrics) or negatively (bounce rate).
Pre-click metrics - this generally refers to any metric describing what
leads a user (or not) to a site, such as click-through rates from an email newslet-
ter.
Reach - number of unique people who have theoretically been exposed
to a given piece of media or a media brand. Facebook uses this metric with
regard to users who have accessed posts. Broadcast ratings calculate reach from
surveys of a subset of the population within an area.
Recirculation - percentage of users who view at least two distinct pages
in the course of a single visit, excluding those who arrive at the homepage and
then view exactly one additional page. Sometimes recirculation is used more
narrowly to mean the percentage of users who view at least two distinct article
pages in a single visit.
Referral Flow - a visualized report, produced by Google in Google Analyt-
ics, of how users find and acquire an app on the Google Play Store.
Referred traffic - also called external traffic, this refers to traffic coming
from a link on an outside site other than social media or via a search engine. A
“referral” is sometimes used to describe a single referred session.
Referrer - variable in the browser request that is used to determine traffic
source.
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Referrer Quality - a Chartbeat metric for ranking referred traffic sources
based on which referrers send the most valuable traffic (i.e., loyal users and
users who return directly to the site rather than those who return only through
the referrer).
Repeat visitor - a user who visits a site two or more times during a report-
ing period.
Return - any consecutive session/visit to a site by a user within 30 days of
an earlier session.
Return rate - the percentage of visitors directed to the site from a specific
referrer who then become returning or loyal visitors.
Return visitor - a user who visits a site during a reporting period and has
visited the site during a previous reporting period.
Scroll depth - how far a user scrolls down on a page.
Search traffic - traffic coming from a search engine, which could include
clicks on paid search ads. Search traffic is sometimes further specified as “paid
traffic” (traffic from paid ads) or “organic search” (Google Analytics’s term for
search traffic excluding paid traffic).
Segment - a group of users defined by any set of criteria for metrics anal-
ysis. Analytics software is generally designed to compare metrics across seg-
ments. Examples of segments are converters (or non-converters), new users, or
users who performed a site search.
Session/visit - a series of page views in a single interaction with a website.
Counts of total sessions/visits typically include all sessions visitors initiate to a
site (including return visits).
Share/social share - a distribution of content on social media.
Shareable - a term used to describe content that appeals to a broad audi-
ence that is likely to repost it on social media.
Site performance metrics - metrics used to analyze the technical perfor-
mance of a website, such as page-load time (which typically includes any time
spent redirecting from one URL to another), execution speed (how long it takes
to load a given user action), and Site Speed (a Google Analytics terms based
on the latter two metrics).
Site traffic - an inexact colloquialism for the number of people visiting a
site.
Social plugin - button placed on the site to share content directly through
a social network.
Social traffic - sessions for which the referrer was a social network.
Spike - a sudden rise in traffic to a site.
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Stickiness - the degree to which a site or application keeps visitors engaged.
Subscriber - a term with different meanings in different contexts; generally
it includes people who have elected to receive or be alerted to particular items
of content.
Take off/blow up/go viral - a sudden rise in page views, shares, and
other engagement relating to a particular piece of content.
Talking about this - a term Facebook uses for the number of unique peo-
ple (in reality, unique Facebook profiles) who have created a story from a given
post or page. On Facebook, a “story” is created when someone likes, comments
on, or shares a post.
Time spent on page/time on page - the amount of time a viewer re-
mains on a single page.
Time Watched (or Watch Time) - a term YouTube uses for the aggre-
gate amount of time viewers are watching videos, normally from a particular
user account.
Today’s Social - a feature of the Chartbeat dashboard, which displays
daily counts of the number of tweets and Facebook likes.
Top Pages - a feature of the Chartbeat dashboard that displays the top-
performing pages on a site at the present moment, based on their number of
concurrent users.
Total Time Reading - a metric developed by Medium to estimate the
amount of time a user spends reading an article, by periodically measuring the
user’s scroll depth and inferring when he/she starts reading, if and when a user
pauses, and when he/she stops reading altogether.
Traffic source - where visitors are coming from when they arrive at a site.
Chartbeat divides traffic sources into five categories: direct, social, external,
internal, and search. Google Analytics sometimes refers to the type of traffic
source as the “medium.”
Trending - used generically to refer to a news story, topic, or hashtag
around which there is an unusually high amount of engagement at a given
moment. Social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter have their own
(proprietary) algorithms for determining trends.
Unique visitor/unique - sometimes referred to as an “active user,” a
unique is an inferred individual person who visits a site or uses its mobile app
at least once within a specified period. Unique site visitors can be inferred
by leaving and tracking “persistent cookies” on a user’s browser. Counts of
uniques are typically filtered for robots and spiders.
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Universal Analytics - Google’s name for a significantly new version of its
analytics suite.
Unknown referrer traffic - sessions for which the request has no referrer
variable. This may include users clicking on bookmarks, typing in a URL, or
clicking a link in an email.
User - a visitor to a site over multiple sessions. In reality, this generally
reflects a specific browser or device (not an individual person) that accesses a
site.
Vanity metrics - metrics that are not deemed sufficiently actionable and
exist more to serve a user’s vanity than to help in decision-making. Vanity
metrics often refer to metrics like page-view counts, which may present publish-
ers/writers with an inflated sense of how many people are engaging with their
content.
Video start - the user action of starting to play a video.
Visit duration - length of time of a single visit/session.
Visitor frequency - also called “return frequency.” Chartbeat divides visi-
tors into three categories based on how frequently they visit a site. New visitors
are those visiting the site for the first time in at least 30 days, loyal visitors
are those who have visited the site on at least eight of the past 16 days, and
returning visitors fall in between these two.
Weekly Audience Perspective - Chartbeat’s weekly summary of user
engagement time, referrer quality, and which visitors are returning to a site.
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